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There are consequences to theories in a world questioning the
power of the President. For decades, some originalists, including
Justice Scalia, maintained that the President enjoys “all” executive
power. Of course, this is not the Constitution’s actual text (which
refers to “the” executive power, not “all” executive power)—but a
highly contestable, and potentially dangerous, addition of meaning to
the text. As I demonstrate in this Article, adding to the actual text of
the Constitution is common in the originalist literature on executive
power, whether the precise question is the President’s removal power,
the President’s power to refuse to enforce the law, or the President’s
obligations under the Emoluments Clause. Using elementary
principles from the philosophy of language—principles that apply to
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* Victoria Nourse, Jack N. Pritzker Visiting Professor of Law, Northwestern Law School;
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I want to thank my colleagues and friends (and
they are my friends), Randy Barnett and Lawrence Solum, for inspiring a work that they may find overly
contentious or deeply wrong. To John Mikhail, I owe an even greater debt for inspiring me to return to
linguistic philosophy in aid of a clearer understanding of the constitutional text. Thanks, as well, to all
those, including Greg Klass, Brian Galle, and others, who discussed this Article at a Georgetown
University Law Center workshop. All errors are, of course, my own. I have obviously used a topic of
current concern to highlight an issue of theoretical importance; none of these scholars, in my view,
believes that the President can act contrary to law.
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all communication—I explain how originalist interpreters in this area
“pragmatically enrich” the text, without articulating or justifying
those additions and without seeking to test those meanings against the
full text of the Constitution. Before one gets to history, the originalist
has assumed a unit of textual analysis—a word, a clause, a
paragraph—that may effectively enrich the meaning to reflect the
interpreter’s preferred policy position. If this is correct, originalists
must theorize the “interpretation zone,” a putatively neutral place
from which historical inquiries are launched, and explain why
interpreters may add meaning by pragmatic enrichment in this zone—
particularly if those meanings are falsified by the rest of the
Constitution. Perhaps more importantly, originalism’s opponents need
to start talking about how to reclaim the actual text of the Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
With the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Neil Gorsuch
confirmed, one very basic question remains as to whether the Supreme Court
will now cleave more closely to Justice Scalia’s theory of constitutional
interpretation—originalism.1 Even more important, given the current presidency,
is the question whether the Court will accept Justice Scalia’s textualist view of
“executive power” as including “all” executive power. These issues of
contemporary concern raise deeper theoretical questions about the relationship
of originalism to textualism, including originalists’ methodological
commitments to an analysis that depends upon, but does not acknowledge, a kind
of textual slicing and dicing that should be subject to greater scrutiny. Before one
gets to history in originalist analysis, one starts with text and sometimes, as in
“all” executive power, the purported text is not, in fact, the actual text of the
Constitution.2
As Justice Elena Kagan has noted, we are all constitutional textualists and
originalists now;3 well not all,4 but textualism has become an extremely

1. As Randy Barnett has written, Justice Scalia was in fact a “faint-hearted” originalist,
unwilling in many cases to overrule lengthy lines of precedent. Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A
Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006); see, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
2. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To repeat,
Article II, § 1, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides: ‘The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States.’ As I described at the outset of this opinion, this does not mean some of the executive
power, but all of the executive power.”); see also id. at 726 (“Humphrey’s Executor at least had the
decency formally to observe the constitutional principle that the President had to be the repository of all
executive power . . . .”). Justice Scalia is not the only one who has urged that the President’s powers are
broad and plenary. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein et al., Federalism: Executive Power in Wartime, 5 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 309, 333 (2007) (quoting John Yoo as stating: “And then the Framers vested the
executive power, all executive power, in the President, in contrast to Article I, which says the legislative
Powers herein enumerated are vested in the Congress . . . .”); Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating
Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 217 (2005) (concluding that Congress “cannot regulate
the President’s constitutional powers”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1038 (2011) (stating that the President has “all” executive power). Note that
originalists differ on whether the President can act contra legem, which is to say, contrary to law. See
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE
L.J. 541, 565 (1994) (noting claims of unenumerated, inherent presidential power to act contra legem
and discussing the skepticism that greets such claims). At least one originalist takes the position that the
term “executive power” is vague. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 470 (2013).
3. Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of
Statutes, at 8:29, HARV. L. TODAY (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecturekagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation [https://perma.cc/D682-ZKZL]; Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (testimony of Elena Kagan).
4. Recently, Judge Posner has declared himself against textualism. See Eric J. Segall, The
Constitution Means What the Supreme Court Says It Means, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 176, 176 (2016).
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important conventional methodological position that deserves greater scrutiny.5
In cases of first impression, constitutional text has been seen as important since
the Founding.6 On the other hand, the rather terse text of the Constitution cannot
possibly account for constitutional doctrine’s enormous reach. The vast, vast
bulk of constitutional law—layers of scrutiny, expectations of privacy, undue
burden tests—has little grounding in constitutional text. In our present world,
textual originalism and common law constitutionalism exist simultaneously.
I leave to others exogenous normative critiques of originalism,7 given its
many, many meanings, some of them overtly politicized and others not.8 History
will play little role in this Article because I mean to question the interpretive step
that occurs before one consults ancient dictionaries—the step that occurs in
selecting and interpreting a constitutional text. I look seriously at the
undertheorized textualist assumptions of “original public meaning”9 focusing on
originalist writing on executive power. I will argue that originalist
interpretations in this area do not, in fact, depend upon the literal text but what
linguistic philosophers call “pragmatic-enrichment”—a basic feature of
linguistic communication—which adds meaning to the text. In these cases, it is
not the text that decides but the interpretive meanings added by interpreters
before they have had recourse to history. Just as Karl Llewellyn blasted canons
5. See, e.g., ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM:
A DEBATE 16 (2011) (“A good interpretation aims at the fixed, original, linguistic meaning of the
text.”).
6. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407–08, 411–16 (1819) (considering the
absence of “bank” or “incorporation” in the Constitution and interpreting the “necessary and proper”
clause). I understand that the textual arguments in this case were embedded in a much richer context.
See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749–58 (1999) (discussing various
constitutional arguments employed in McCulloch, particularly intratextualism). Saying “text is
important” is not to deny that other forms of argument were common and present in this case and others.
In my view, the true “originalist” method was derived from Blackstone’s theory of statutory
interpretation and is pluralistic. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
59–62 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1765–1769) (discussing the various steps of statutory interpretation
and how to resolve statutory ambiguity, including references to “subject matter” and “reason” of the
statute).
7. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1 (2015). David Strauss, among others, has argued that to accept originalism one would
have to accept all sorts of unacceptable normative propositions. Originalist scholars have provided
powerful rejoinders. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions,
81 VA. L. REV. 947, 950–54 (1995) (arguing that an originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment would not permit school segregation). My critique is not about the normative consequences
of particular decisions but undertheorized interpretive methodology and therefore should be of interest
to originalists and non-originalists.
8. For a useful taxonomy of the varieties of originalism, including the term’s “thick” ability to
combine both ideological and descriptive concepts, see Lawrence Solum, The Constraint Principle:
Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice 6–9, 15–18 (Mar. 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940215 [https://perma.cc/XZ5A-8V7H].
9. Original public meaning is described as “conventional semantic meaning” and is
distinguished from original expected application meaning. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 5, at 11–16
(arguing that original public meaning is an argument about “the way that language works,” not an
argument about normative ends).
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from the inside, arguing that there is a counter-canon for every canon,10 this
Article argues, from what appears to be “inside” the interpretation zone, that
originalists and non-originalists must have a much more precise, and theorized,
approach toward the constitutional text.11 In the cases that follow, the hard edges
of constraint are too often edges added by interpreters.
Originalists complain that scholars refuse to be “bound by the actual words
of the Constitution because those words are obstacles to noble objectives.”12 If
this is true, it is time for those who have resisted textualism to embrace what I
call “analytic textualism.” I accept the notion that text, where clear, governs.
Text can operate as the conscience13 of a court whose own precedents have
strayed far and wide. I also recognize that originalists differ in their theoretical
approach and their view of executive power.14 On the other hand, a good deal of
originalist analysis of executive power lacks a consistent theory of the unit of
textual analysis or awareness that originalist interpretations can, in fact, add
meaning to the text of the Constitution, before resorting to historical materials.
If I am correct about the choice and enrichment of text in this area, both
textualists and originalists must consider whether this “added meaning”
phenomenon is generalizable to other areas of constitutional law15 and whether

10. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
11. Lawrence Solum has done the most to theorize textual analysis in originalist theory, and my
approach here would not exist but for his attention to textual detail and philosophical nuance. Indeed,
Solum was the first to identify pragmatic enrichment and presupposition in textual analysis of the
Constitution. See Solum, supra note 2, at 465 n.47.
12. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 2 (Princeton Univ. Press rev. ed. 2014) (2004).
13. As Thomas Jefferson asserted, “written constitutions may be violated in moments of passion
or delusion, yet they furnish a text to which those who are watchful may again rally [and] recall the
people . . . .” Eric R. Nitz, Note, Comparing Apples to Apples: A Federalism-Based Theory for the Use
of Founding-Era State Constitutions to Interpret the Constitution, 100 GEO. L.J. 295, 297 (2011)
(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Doctor Joseph Priestley (June 19, 1802), in 8 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 158, 159–60 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897)). To accept this is not to concede
the point that text always constrains; this is a claim that text can reflect an experience of life that, as a
normative (as opposed to a linguistic) matter, deserves recognition. For example, a redemptive
originalism would urge judges to reconsider why they have read the privileges and immunities clause
out of the Constitution.
14. Libertarian originalists have every reason to reject broad executive power. Larry Solum has
written that the term “executive power” is vague. Solum, supra note 2, at 470. This is contrary to the
claims of Calabresi and Prakash, Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 557, and Calabresi and Rhodes,
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); see also STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO,
THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) (examining
presidential power under each presidential administration from George Washington through George W.
Bush and arguing that all advanced the unitary executive theory); Gary Lawson & Christopher D.
Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996) (affirming
the interpretation of the Vesting Clauses as a grant of power).
15. There are reasons to think that it is. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 2566, 2573, 2586–87 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (writing that the Affordable Care Act
violated the Commerce Clause, reading that clause as covering only “existing” commerce); Marbury v.
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it is consistent with originalism’s basic commitments to the text. Perhaps more
importantly, this Article should be a provocation for those who disagree with
originalism: the non-textualist and non-originalist cannot simply ignore text;
they must learn to work out, and resist, textual claims that are not in fact found
in the Constitution.
The roadmap: In Part I, I consider the state of originalism and its
presumptions about text and history, arguing that, in the case of executive power,
originalists have relied upon text as much as history. In Part II, I argue that
originalists theorize an “interpretation zone” in which meaning is non-normative
and self-evident but that this makes two crucial contestable assumptions. These
are: (1) the originalist has chosen the proper and only relevant text and has not
added to the text by pragmatic inference; and (2) the text chosen—one or two
words in some cases—amounts to the proper unit of textual analysis. Using two
basic principles from the philosophy of language—pragmatic inference and
cancellation—this Part amplifies this methodological critique. In Part III, the
concepts developed in Part II are applied to famous cases about executive power
from Steel Seizure to Morrison v. Olson.16 I argue that liberal and conservative
judges are not, in fact, relying upon the text but adding to the text on executive
power and that the whole text can falsify their inferred additions. In Part IV, I
apply this critique to originalist arguments on topics of current importance
relating to the President’s powers, including the Emoluments Clause, the
removal question, and the President’s non-enforcement power. I demonstrate
contestable textual enrichment in each area. Finally, in Part V, I consider
objections to this claim, distinguish it from other theories on constitutional text
(such as intratexualism and holism), and defend pluralism as a restraint on false
textual meanings.
I.
ORIGINALISM’S TEXTUAL METHODOLOGY
Theories of originalism abound. So do critiques. Once upon a time,
theorists argued about whether one should care about the Founders’ original
expectations; now they search for “original public meanings.”17 In the 1990s,
originalism’s critics seemed satisfied to say that history was vague, and the

Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173–75 (1803) (reading Article III original jurisdiction as exclusive);
see also Victoria Nourse, Picking and Choosing Text, 70 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (applying
this analysis to a variety of statutory cases).
16. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988).
17. BARNETT, supra note 12, at 95; Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution
of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12, 22–23 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
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Founders themselves were faint-hearted originalists.18 By the end of the decade,
many thought originalism dead.19 Meanwhile, in real life, originalism has grown
stronger. It has grown stronger on the Supreme Court, where it has had notable
victories.20 As Justice Kagan has said, we are all originalists now.21 And it has
grown stronger in the academy: those who once argued against originalism have
rebranded themselves “living originalists,”22 while an array of scholars invoke
“original meanings” to support liberal or libertarian causes.23 It seems
worthwhile, at this moment in time, to pay attention to originalism—from a
different perspective—from inside its textual presumptions.
The critique that follows differs from standard external complaints against
originalism. Others have claimed that originalism yields unfortunate
outcomes24—that it embraces racism or excludes women—critiques that over
time have waned as originalists have written lengthy histories denying such
claims.25 Still others continue to claim that judges are incapable of historical
analysis26 or that the Founders themselves were not originalists.27 Others seem
more resigned, claiming to turn the tables, urging that originalism is really living
constitutionalism in historical disguise.28
All of these things may be true but are irrelevant for my argument, which
is pitched at a higher level of abstraction. I assume, for purposes of this argument,
originalism’s most basic claim—that the text of the Constitution is the rule of
law. For decades, this has been the cri de coeurs of originalists who argue that
judges and their “academic enablers . . . think they can improve upon the original

18. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 611–13 (1999)
(discussing a movement in the 1980s that criticized originalism as unworkable and inconsistent with the
expectations of the framers).
19. Id. at 611 (“The received wisdom among law professors is that originalism is dead . . . .”).
20. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (relying on originalist
reasoning to hold that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms).
21. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62
(2010) (testimony of Elena Kagan).
22. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2014).
23. See, e.g., LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND
SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE (2016) (applying the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment in
the context of modern intelligence programs).
24. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); Strauss, supra note 7.
25. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage,
70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648 (2016); Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex
Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011); McConnell, supra note 7.
26. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, “Don’t Know Much About History” The Current Crisis in Second
Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 657 (2002) (highlighting the flaws in judicial treatment of
Second Amendment history); Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 524–26 (1995) (noting the tendency of judges to refer to
problematic historical analysis).
27. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885 (1985).
28. See BALKIN, supra note 22.
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Constitution . . . .”29 As Randy Barnett writes, “[w]hy care about what the
Constitution actually says, as opposed to what we might prefer it to say . . . ?”30
It has also been the cry of many who have argued insistently over executive
power. To give just one example (more will follow later), consider the grand
arguments about the “unitary executive,” a concept that has been embraced by
Justice Scalia in one of his most important dissents and which has produced book
length treatments.31 Unitary executivists argue that the constitutional text
demands that the President have hierarchical authority over the executive branch.
In 1994, Cass Sunstein and Larry Lessig wrote a lengthy article in the
Columbia Law Review arguing that the originalist claim for a “unitary executive”
was inconsistent with history; the earliest Congresses exercised discretion to
shape the executive branch.32 In reply, originalists Steven Calabresi and
Saikrishna Prakash wrote a very lengthy piece in the Yale Law Journal,
chastising Sunstein and Lessig for their historical method. The point of
originalism, Calabresi and Prakash insisted, was not history but text. Calabresi
and Prakash wrote: “[I]t seems clear that those who wish to understand the
meaning of a new constitutional text must start with the words of the text and
then see what their public meaning was at the time they were ratified into law.”33
In their more recent book length treatment of the unitary executive, Calabresi
and Christopher Yoo reiterate their argument that historical practice should yield
to the “text and structure of the Constitution.”34
Since these claims were made, originalist theory has expanded and become
more precise. Originalists have expended a good deal of effort distinguishing
between interpretation and construction of constitutional text.35 As one of the
leading proponents of this theoretical distinction, Lawrence Solum writes:
The interpretation-construction distinction, which marks the difference
between linguistic meaning and legal effect, is much discussed these
days. I shall argue that the distinction is both real and fundamental—
that it marks a deep difference in two different stages (or moments) in

29. BARNETT, supra note 12, at 1.
30. Id. at 1–2.
31. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727, 732 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see CALABRESI
& YOO, supra note 14.
32. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1994).
33. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 557 (emphasis added).
34. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 8.
35. For an early treatment, see BARNETT, supra note 12. Solum defines the “construction zone”
as the set of issues and cases for which the communicative content of the constitutional text does not
provide a fully determinate answer—a zone of underdetermination. Lawrence B. Solum, The
Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 108 (2010). By way of analogy, the
“interpretation zone,” would be the set of issues and outcomes for which the communicative content of
the text does not provide a determinate (or nearly determinate) outcome. See Heidi Kitrosser,
Interpretive Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. 459, 464–66 (2016).
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the way that legal and political actors process legal texts.36
Although some originalists have taken issue with the distinction,37 many
others embrace it. Keith Whittington, for example, has dubbed constitutional
interpretation essentially “legalistic,” while constitutional construction is
necessary to resolve linguistic “indeterminacies.”38 Randy Barnett similarly
supports the interpretation-construction distinction, writing that “[w]hat defines
originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation is the belief that (a) the
semantic meaning of the written Constitution was fixed at the time of its
enactment and that (b) this meaning should be followed by constitutional actors
until it is properly changed by a written amendment.”39 Even those originalists
who have sought to distance themselves from “original meaning” as the only

36. Solum, supra note 35, at 95; see also Solum, supra note 2, at 492–95; Lawrence B. Solum,
The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551, 568–77 (2010); Lawrence B. Solum, District of
Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 971–80 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum,
Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 436–38 (2009); Lawrence
B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 [https://perma.cc/RC9Y-X84C].
37. See Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability
Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739, 1747 n.25 (2013) (referring to Solum’s approach as “an idiosyncratic
and unnecessary wrinkle that other originalists have not fully appreciated and are unlikely to find
congenial”); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Implementation and
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 175 (2006) (arguing that no distinction exists where
“the meaning of a constitutional provision is its implementation”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 772–75 (2009) (objecting to the interpretation-construction
distinction because original interpretive rules offer a plausible way to resolve ambiguity and because
construction was not embraced by the founders); Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69
OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 615–16, 616 n.34 (2008) (citing the interpretation-construction distinction as an
example of a new originalist distinction that is “hardly intuitive, whose precise application may lead to
missteps”); see also Laura A. Cisneros, The Constitutional Interpretation/Construction Distinction: A
Useful Fiction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 71, 76–80 (2010) (describing differing views about the
interpretation-construction distinction and concluding that the distinction is “neither obvious nor
identifiable through the application of an accepted and uniform set of rules”); B. Jessie Hill, Resistance
to Constitutional Theory: The Supreme Court, Constitutional Change, and the “Pragmatic Moment,”
91 TEX. L. REV. 1815, 1831 (2013) (observing that the “context dependency of language . . . throws into
question” the interpretation-construction distinction).
38. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1999); see also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1–19 (1999).
39. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66
(2011); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411
(2013) (discussing “New Originalism” and a “gravitational force” that originalism exerts on legal
doctrine regardless of whether originalism provides the basis for the decision); Randy E. Barnett, The
Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 616 (2009)
(challenging the assumption that the original meaning of the Constitution is consistent with segregated
schools or the inferiority of women); Barnett, supra note 18, at 660 (arguing that originalism survived
the challenges it faced in the 1980s and has become the dominant approach to constitutional
interpretation).
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constraint on constitutional interpretation, acknowledge that there is some safe,
neutral zone of textual meaning.40
Accepting that textual analysis is the first step in proper constitutional
approach, I question the neutrality of that first step in what I might call, bowing
to Lawrence Solum, the “interpretation zone.” Focusing on the field of executive
power,41 I contend that originalist interpreters of executive power regularly
misread the Constitution’s text. Not to put too fine a point on it, originalists
specializing in this field of executive power too often make up their own preferred
meaning of the text, enriching the text’s meaning with strained inferences. This
is not true of all originalists,42 but it is certainly true of enough work on
presidential power that it deserves greater scrutiny. To demonstrate that these are
in fact additions to meaning, I deploy a “falsification” approach to read the
Constitution. This approach is both more precise and more faithful to the full
document. It requires that the interpreter (1) work out what interpreters add, by
implication, to the text; and (2) work out whether that implication is cancelled
(falsified) by the rest of the text. If there is more than one implication, the
interpreter must engage in constitutional “construction,” based on traditional
pluralist interpretive tools.43
Call this textual methodology “analytic textualism.” This approach rejects
the tendency to pull single words or terms from the Constitution out of context
and put them in an entirely new context to create new meanings. My approach is
a post-originalist theory in the sense that Scott Soames has described postoriginalism or as Lawrence Solum has elaborated it in his methodological
writings;44 it claims, like Richard Fallon, that originalists need a better theory of
textual meaning.45 Unlike Fallon, who contends that there are many possible
theories of meaning, I argue that any theory of constitutional meaning must
depend upon basic principles of communication. At a minimum, any asserted
40. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1079 (2017).
41. It is entirely possible, of course, that this thesis does not apply to other areas of originalist
thought, such as the meaning of the “commerce power,” Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction
Theory of “Commerce,” 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 623 (2012), or the Second Amendment, Solum, District
of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, supra note 36. Of course, given that my theory rests on basic
features of communication, it would be entirely appropriate in future work to test that hypothesis.
42. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 2, at 470 (executive power is vague).
43. For a discussion of pluralism, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982)
(providing a classic elucidation of forms of pluralism); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987) (advocating for a
“constructivist coherence” method of interpretation, which centers on the use of multiple constitutional
arguments).
44. Soames calls his theory deferentialism. Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 597 (2013); see also Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269 (2017) (articulating an originalist methodology that
draws on linguistic theories as well as legal theory and emphasizes the role of context in constitutional
interpretation and construction).
45. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories
of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1241–43 (2015).
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inference from the text must not be inconsistent with the rest of the Constitution.
By “inconsistency,” I mean that hypothesized meanings may not be “falsified”
or “cancelled” by the rest of the Constitution. (In Part II, I explain what I mean
by “falsify” or “cancel.”) Not only should non-originalists find this welcome but
so too should originalists. In theory, there is nothing inconsistent with this
approach to the text and the basic commitments of originalist theory, nor is it
inconsistent with a more robust version of pluralism.46 My claims are simply
about the beginning of the analysis, not about what happens when there is no text
or when the text is ambiguous—something I expect happens in almost every case
that reaches the Supreme Court.
If one accepts this approach, one will find that there are no textual answers
to the “executive power” questions raised here. Because there is no “hard textual
answer” to these questions, courts must, in my view, turn to standard pluralist
methods: history, structure, precedent, and consequences to resolve conflicting
textual interpretations. Pluralism is ancient, reaching back to the Founding,47 but
it has been incorrectly theorized as a grab bag of approaches rather than as a
constraint against false hypothesized readings. In fact, a restrained pluralism48
resists false readings by testing the words against their effects: how the world
has treated these questions in the past and what has happened because of these
words in the world, to the Constitution and real life (what Madison called the
“liquidat[ion]” of meaning).49 This Article does not purport to provide a full
theory of constitutional interpretation or a full defense of restrained pluralism; it
takes the first step in that direction by suggesting a previously untheorized
conception of pluralism as a constraint on false textual enrichment.
Some will find “analytic textualism’s” approach too narrow, insisting that
all great theories of the Constitution must depend upon grand political morality.
There is a problem with this “they go low, we go high” strategy: elitism. One
reason that originalism has had a real political effect in the world is that its core
idea—the importance of the constitutional text—speaks to citizens. The idea that
the Constitution can be read, and presumably understood, by everyone is an
important element in our constitutional and political culture. To argue that
constitutional theory must emphasize the Supreme Court’s complex judicial
46. Originalists, at a minimum, believe in the fixation of text and that text constrains. See
BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 5, at 2. Those two commitments are entirely consistent with “analytic
textualism” based on reading the “whole” text. To the extent I endorse pluralism, which would include
review of interpretive consequences, my view is unlikely to be viewed as originalism.
47. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6.
48. I recognize that, for some, this will represent a radical restructuring of the conventional ideas
of pluralism but, alas, the focus of this Article on executive power does not permit a greater defense than
provided in Part IV.
49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 236 (James Madison) (Jacob Ernest Cooke ed., 1961).
Liquidation of meaning over time is different from early uses of particular texts of the Constitution as a
kind of lexicon. Liquidation in the sense I am using it here involves the notion that practice over time
yields real world experiences solidifying a position on an otherwise vague text. An originalist is likely
to consider the former lexicon use but may not necessarily consider the latter.
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doctrine,50 or judges who like to make the Constitution “live,”51 or moral
theorists who want to dictate “right answers,”52 is to imply, even if
unintentionally, that the Constitution is above the people. The originalist
insistence on the text of the Constitution is something no citizen is likely to deny.
Whatever elite courts may do, the power of the Constitution’s text means
something in everyday American politics.
The battle that follows will be pitched, in the first parts, at the level of
words, which will cause some discomfort to those preferring grander theory.
Academics tend to value high levels of abstraction. They also tend to value
theories that have little real world potential: throwing the Constitution to the
winds or holding a new constitutional convention.53 From these perspectives, my
approach may seem petty, picayune, or insufficiently theoretical. But if the real
world is fighting at a different pitch, at a level where words constitute bullets, to
refuse to resist those bullets because it is beneath one’s station is to resign oneself
to the possibility of grave injury, all the while claiming one is above the battle.
Given the current state of the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that originalism’s
jurisprudential gestalt will disappear. Justice Gorsuch will only strengthen that
tendency in a world that will raise important questions about the exercise of
presidential power. It is time, then, to test the textual (as opposed to the
historical) theories upon which originalist theories of executive power are based.
II.
SPARSE TEXT, ADDED MEANING
The most obvious and basic feature of our Constitution is that its text is
sparse. Economy of expression distinguishes a constitution from a legal code.
No linguist denies that, faced with skimpy texts, interpreters are likely to
interpolate or add to the meaning of raw text when seeking to apply the text to a
particular context. Linguists call these “pragmatic enrichments” or “pragmatic
inferences.”54 Put more colloquially, interpreters tend to fill in the blanks in any
communication. It is equally basic that these enrichments are hypothesized

50. See Strauss, supra note 7.
51. STRAUSS, supra note 24. I reject the term “living constitutionalism” as verging on the
oxymoronic. “Living” suggests instability and constitutionalism denotes stability. This is a very poor
term to describe what I believe to be the most stable theory of constitutional methodology, pluralism.
52. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 185–86, 279–90 (1977) (challenging the
idea that no “right answer” exists for difficult questions of law and morality).
53. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED (2012) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution, like
many state constitutions, warrants updating); LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL
DISOBEDIENCE (2012) (arguing against the view that the Constitution is binding and in favor of
disobedience). I too value these theories as a legal academic seeking to understand the Constitution’s
role in a larger polity, but my experience in courts and in politics makes me wonder about their value to
constitutional law, which has increasingly pitched itself in an entirely different register.
54. See generally STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS (1983); DEIRDRE WILSON & DAN
SPERBER, MEANING AND RELEVANCE 3–10 (2012); PERSPECTIVES ON PRAGMATICS AND PHILOSOPHY
89–90 (Alessandra Capone et al. eds., 2013).
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meanings—they are not the “actual” meaning of the text but attempts to apply
the raw text to a particular context, by the addition of meanings. These
hypothesized, enriched meanings can, in turn, be falsified by consulting new,
conflicting information.
A. Meaning, Pragmatic Inference, and Originalism
Like all forms of communication, the Constitution is economical, using
relatively few words to convey meaning. All speech is economical in some
sense—it typically says less than it means.55 I may say to you, “I’ll go get that.”
The listener will have to rely upon the context of “that” to determine the meaning
of my communication.
In linguistics, context adds meaning and is typically considered to add
meaning by “pragmatic inference.”56 So, for example, if I say “fifth” and the
interpreter assumes that I am referring to the “Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution,” she has “enriched” the meaning by adding a legal context.
Literally, the term “fifth” could mean any number of things, from the fifth
linebacker to a fifth of gin, depending upon whether I was at a football game or
in a liquor store. Specifying some features of context does not eliminate the
potential for pragmatic enrichment. If we all know that I am saying “fifth” in a
legal context, without further clarification, I could still mean anything from the
fifth paragraph in a contract to the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution or the
fifth Article of the U.S. Code.
For purposes of this Article, I will use the term “pragmatic inference” or
“pragmatic enrichment” to mean the kind of addition to meaning that
philosophers of language describe when they talk about interpretation. The
linguistic philosopher Scott Soames offers the following example to show how
even the most basic of terms may need additional information to precisify
meaning: “Matriculated students are allowed to take five courses.”57 At the
semantic level, this statement does not tell us whether the term “five” means
exactly five, at least five, at most five, or other contextually determined qualifiers
of “five.”58 If the interpreter adds “exactly” or “at least,” they are adding meaning
separate and apart from the term “five.” Linguists, such as Kent Bach, call this
form of interpretation by the name “impliciture,” on the theory that the
interpreter adds meaning already implicit in the expression. Other linguists

55. See, e.g., WILSON & SPERBER, supra note 54, at 10–12 (explaining how implicatures and
explicatures communicate meaning beyond what the speaker has said).
56. See STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRESUMPTIVE MEANINGS: THE THEORY OF GENERALIZED
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE 20–22 (2000) (arguing that interpreters add meanings to semantic
content based on generalized assumptions); see also PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS
(1989) (establishing the basis for Grice’s theory of language, including his theory of pragmatic
implicature).
57. Scott Soames, Drawing the Line Between Meaning and Implicature—and Relating Both to
Assertion, 42 NOÛS 440, 451 (2008).
58. Id. at 451–53.
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purporting to follow or reject the work of Paul Grice might use the names
“implicature” or “explicature.”59 For my purposes, internecine debates within
linguistics about these terms matter less than the notion that contextual
enrichment occurs by inference due to the economy of expression. Pragmatic
inference is not a linguistically controversial practice. Contending camps within
linguistics, semanticists and pragmatists, have embraced this idea.60
Lest this seem orthogonal to originalism, some theorists of originalism have
embraced the notion that pragmatic enrichment is part of interpretation, a part
that precedes any “construction” of vague terms.61 In short, they have posited
that there is some space where meaning is clear and can be precisified by
historical example or definitions,62 even if there exists a large, and capacious,
role for courts to play in constitutional construction—in cases where the
Constitution’s words are cavernous and aspirational (i.e. “due process of law,”
“equal protection of the law”). Originalists debate the scope of constitutional
construction and even the distinction between interpretation and construction,63
but, as a general rule, they theorize that there is a space where interpretation
yields meanings that determine or nearly determine legal content. Call this the
“interpretation zone.” Even those theorists, like Will Baude and Stephen Sachs,
who question whether public meaning can do all “originalist” work and seek
constraint in canons of construction, posit a realm of easy cases where meaning
59. See Kent Bach, The Top 10 Misconceptions About Implicature, in DRAWING THE
BOUNDARIES OF MEANING: NEO-GRICEAN STUDIES IN PRAGMATICS AND SEMANTICS IN HONOR OF
LAURENCE R. HORN 21 (Betty J. Birner & Gregory Ward eds., 2006). “Implicature” comes from Grice,
although now it is a term of art accepted, if contested, by a variety of linguists. See, e.g., Laurence R.
Horn, Implicature, in THE HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS 3 (Laurence R. Horn & Gregory Ward eds.,
2004); YAN HUANG, PRAGMATICS 25–83 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing various theories of implicature,
including Gricean and neo-Gricean pragmatic theories). “Explicature” is associated with Wilson and
Sperber’s relevance theory. See WILSON & SPERBER, supra note 54, at 160. None of these theorists deny
that contextual enrichment occurs by inference due to economy of expression.
60. See, e.g., JAMES R. HURFORD, BRENDAN HEASLEY & MICHAEL B. SMITH, SEMANTICS: A
COURSEBOOK 260–326 (2d ed. 2007); NICK RIEMER, INTRODUCING SEMANTICS 118–20 (2010); JOHN
I. SAEED, SEMANTICS 210–19 (4th ed. 2016); see also WILLIAM G. LYCAN, PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 165 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the importance of
context and noting that pragmatics is “about the functioning of language in context”); CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS 308–21 (Alex Barber & Robert J.
Stainton eds., 2010) (discussing the prevailing approaches to implicature); KEY IDEAS IN LINGUISTICS
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 86–92 (Siobhan Chapman & Christopher Routledge eds., 2009)
(discussing implicature generally).
61. See e.g., Solum, supra note 44, at 278, 286–92; Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as
Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1125–28 (2015).
62. Solum, supra note 44, at 278 (“[I]nterpretation is a factual inquiry that yields
communicative content, whereas construction is a norm-guided activity that yields constitutional
doctrines, decisions in constitutional cases, and constitutionally salient actions by officials.”); see also
John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied
Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063 (2015) (employing Gricean principles to understand what powers the
Constitution vests in the federal government); Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of
Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 498 (2011) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment should be read as a
precise and limited rule of construction).
63. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 37.
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can be determined by dictionaries, history, or through the application of
canons.64
My claim here is not that such a place does not exist, but that, if there is a
neutral “interpretation zone,” it does not resolve many important constitutional
questions on executive power. No one doubts, for example, that each state elects
two Senators, but that question is easy and not likely to be contested in the future.
Precisely because the Constitution is so sparse in its terms, it requires enriched
hypothesized meanings to answer real life problems, and because it requires such
hypothesized, additional meanings, one must fear that the scope of a neutral,
interpretation zone is quite small. If the examples I offer below are correct, they
show that in a large range of cases involving executive power—from the removal
power, to the Emoluments Clause, to the President’s power to refuse to enforce
law—originalist interpreters have not applied the actual text. They have added
hypothesized text that can be, and often is, falsified by the rest of the
Constitution.
Some originalists will no doubt object that I am confusing interpretation
and construction zones. Lawrence Solum, for example, has written that the very
meaning of “executive power” is vague and thus its application to borderline
cases requires some method of constitutional “construction.”65 But originalists
specializing in executive power have taken precisely the opposite line, declaring
the text to be clear or clearly capable of interpretation.66 As noted above, they
openly and fervently reject historical evidence in favor of text. I do not disagree
with Solum that what is involved here is “construction”; I do disagree with the
vast amount of work that has been written assuming that questions about
executive power—from non-enforcement to removal to emoluments—sits in a
neutral, norm-free, “interpretation zone.”
B. Pragmatic Inference, Linguistics, and Cancellation
History, if nothing else, shows that the Supreme Court makes important,
and perhaps crucial, inferences embellishing the actual, constitutional text. One
of the most revered Supreme Court opinions—McCulloch v. Maryland67—
explains the process of pragmatic inference. The question there was the meaning
of the “Necessary and Proper” clause.68 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that
the term “necessary” has no “fixed” character, but “admits of all degrees of

64. Baude & Sachs, supra note 40, at 1143 (“[T]he easy cases . . . seem easy because a particular
theory has become second nature . . . . It’s an easy case . . . that a new criminal statute takes the laws of
duress or accessory liability as it finds them.”).
65. Solum, supra note 2, at 470. Solum argues that “construction” occurs when one moves from
semantic content to legal effect.
66. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 557; Calabresi &
Rhodes, supra note 14; Lawson & Moore, supra note 14.
67. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
68. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.

16

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1

comparison.”69 Those comparisons are provided by “other words” that “increase
or diminish” the urgency of the matter: a thing may be “necessary, very
necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary.”70
Without saying so, Chief Justice Marshall has explained the principle of
pragmatic inference, noting that the term “necessary” is only precisified by
adding modifiers, modifiers that clarify meaning. In other words, Chief Justice
Marshall is identifying a range of potential pragmatic enrichments. Chief Justice
Marshall highlights that the state of Maryland is making an inference when it
argues that the term “necessary” means “absolutely” necessary. Chief Justice
Marshall rejects that addition of meaning, referring to another clause in the
Constitution which does, in fact, use the term “absolutely necessary” to limit the
power of states to impose taxes on imports.71
In this opinion, then, Chief Justice Marshall shows us what philosophers of
language call pragmatic inference—additions made to precisify text—but he
gestures as well to the notion that the whole text may add information relevant
to the purported pragmatic addition.72 In philosophical linguistics, this idea is
captured more precisely by the idea of “cancelling” a pragmatic inference, a
phenomenon that the linguistic philosopher Paul Grice first identified.73
Cancellation means that new information may “cancel” the original purported
pragmatic enrichment. One common example is that of the “professor, writing a
letter of recommendation for a job candidate,” who writes only that her student’s
“command of English is excellent, and his attendance in class has been
regular.”74 The implication—technically, an implicature—is that the candidate
is not terribly qualified, even if the letter does not literally say that. That added
implication can be “cancelled” if the letter writer continues and says, “and she
received the best score on her exam.” The original pragmatic inference (she is
not a very good student) is cancelled by the addition of information (she scored
high on the exam). Another common example involves “a stranded motorist
seeking help.” The motorist says, “I’m out of gas,” and the response is: “There
is a gas station around the corner.” This implicates a presupposition that the gas
station is “open for business.” That implicated presupposition, however, can be
negated or cancelled by additional information—“but the gas station is closed.”
If this is correct, it is possible that purported inferences obtained from sparse or

69. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 414.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. For a commanding analysis of all of Chief Justice Marshall’s intertextual moves, see Amar,
supra note 6, at 749–58. As I explain in Part IV, intratextual analyses can fall prey to purported
enrichments as well.
73. LEVINSON, supra note, 54, at 114 (“[Grice] isolates five characteristic properties of which
the first, and perhaps the most important, is that they are cancellable, or more exactly defeasible.”). For
its application in constitutional analysis, see Mikhail, supra note 62, at 1073–75.
74. Soames, supra note 57, at 442.
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partial texts can, in fact, be falsified by adding to the information economy (i.e.
consulting more text).75
Critics might argue that relying upon Grice’s work raises problems:
Controversy surrounds Grice’s theory of conversational maxims. Nothing in my
argument depends, however, upon the validity or multiple reinterpretations of
Gricean maxims. Even linguists who reject those maxims, or reconceive them
entirely, accept the concepts of “pragmatic inference” and “cancellation.”76 As
one linguist I spoke to said, “no one denies the idea of pragmatic enrichment.”77
Similarly, there is a consensus about “cancellation,”78 which is to say, the basic
concept that what we add by pragmatic enrichment may be negated by further
information in “full” communication. These ideas are well accepted by a wide
variety of linguists.79 In this Article, I generalize from these more technical
concepts to consider how interpreters “enrich” meaning, how those
“enrichments” may be contested or inconsistent with competing enrichments,
and in some cases, how the full text explicitly cancels or negates these
enrichments.
Some may object that we should not view the Constitution as a conversation
because it is a formal document, a document meant to cohere in ways different
from daily conversation. That idea resonates with originalists and textualists who
regard the Constitution as a contract.80 That idea is wrong, in my view,81 but
irrelevant to the claims made here. Even if one conceives of the Constitution as
a contract, it is not a secret contract, hidden from the people. As long as we think
that the Constitution communicates, we should accept the idea that it is likely to
be read in ways similar to other communications. One of the signature qualities
of our Constitution is brevity; there is no reason, then, to reject the notion that
interpreters will add meaning by pragmatic inference82 to the constitutional text.
Even if one believes that the Constitution is somehow immune from
principles governing language more generally, enrichment, contested
enrichment, and cancellation remain relevant to any internal critique of
originalist theories. Richard Fallon has argued that there are various legal
“meanings” of “meaning” used by lawyers that may not track semantic or
linguistic meaning. For Fallon, since “meaning” is itself a matter of contention,
75. Id. at 443.
76. See Mikhail, supra note 62, at 1073–75; supra note 53 and accompanying text.
77. Nick Allott, University of Oslo.
78. See Mikhail, supra note 62, 1073–75 (discussing a common example of the distinction
between implication and entailment, including a discussion of cancellation).
79. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 54, at 114; WILSON & SPERBER, supra note 54, at 309–12
(discussing the concepts implied from the context and their cancellation).
80. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 40.
81. And in the view of other scholars. See, e.g., Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About
Constitutional Assumptions, supra note 39, at 616 (criticizing “a mistaken conflation of constitutions
and contracts”).
82. Some originalists, like Larry Solum, agree with the idea that interpretation includes
pragmatic inferences. See Solum, supra note 35.

18

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1

originalist claims cannot safely find constraint in original meanings.83 I agree
with Fallon’s claims that language is not enough to resolve great constitutional
cases, but the problem lies deeper than ambiguities about “meaning.” Even if one
assumes a unified definition of meaning, given the linguistic economy of the
Constitution, interpreters will be forced to add meaning by “pragmatic
enrichment” to resolve particular controversies. This move can occur under any
theory of meaning—intended meaning, reasonable meaning, or dictionary
meaning. As we will see, the very choice of a relevant text is itself capable of
yielding pragmatic enrichment. That choice and the potential for enrichment,
both in theory and in practice, occurs before the application of history or canons
of constitutional construction. To use McCulloch as an example, if one enriches
the term “necessary” with the idea of “absolute” necessity, and then looks to
original public meaning or canons of construction to confirm that meaning, one
is simply confirming the interpreters’ added meaning, not the actual,
underdetermined, meaning of the constitutional text.
III.
ENRICHING EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWER
Now that I have introduced the concepts of enrichment, contested
enrichment, and cancellation, let me generalize and apply these ideas to some of
the Supreme Court’s most famous cases on executive power. I begin with an
opinion written by a liberal textualist, Justice Hugo Black, and then turn to one
written by a conservative textualist, Justice Scalia. In both cases, the opinions
depend upon purported pragmatic enrichments—additions to the text, not the
actual text—that are contested and may be cancelled by the full text. In Part IV,
I turn to contemporary constitutional controversies to show how this interpretive
tendency affects scholarly treatments of the removal power, the Emoluments
Clause, and the President’s power to refuse to enforce the law.
A. A Liberal Textualist Argument and Its Pragmatic Enrichment
In a number of cases, the Justices have been asked to consider the extent of
the President’s executive authority. In the most famous of these cases,
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Black, a liberal textualist,
urged that President Harry Truman could not seize domestic steel mills because
he was exercising “legislative” rather than “executive” power.84 As Justice Black
wrote: “The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the
recommending of laws [the President] thinks wise and the vetoing of the laws he
thinks bad.”85 As many critics of the Black opinion have noted, executive
agencies engage in “lawmaking” every day—they issue regulations—and the

83.
84.
85.

See Fallon, supra note 45.
343 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1952).
Id. at 587.
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President issues executive orders. If the President makes law in these ways, the
critic asks: Why cannot the President exercise “legislative power” with respect
to the steel mills?86
Justice Black’s argument depends on a pragmatic enrichment of the text,
not the actual text. Justice Black quotes the Vesting Clause of Article I, “All
legislative Powers herein granted . . . ,” and the Necessary and Proper Clause’s
reference to “all Laws.”87 He explains those texts, however, by writing that
Congress has “exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and
proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution.”88 Note that the
Constitution does not say that Congress has exclusive legislative authority.
Exclusivity is Justice Black’s pragmatic enrichment. That pragmatic enrichment
occurs because the interpreter has focused on a very small part of the text—
“all”—wrenching it from its immediate context. Even if we open the textual
frame just a few more words, we can see that the text of Article I, Section 1 itself
denies that the Congress has “all” legislative power since it limits “legislative”
power to those powers “herein granted.”89 Congress has enumerated legislative
powers, not every power that could possibly be deemed “legislative.”
Notice, as well, that Justice Black picked particular texts to support his
argument, to the exclusion of other constitutional texts. This very choice, the
isolation of a word or clause, puts a thumb on the scale on one side of the
interpretive question, privileging and ignoring other text. Not surprisingly, the
President’s lawyers chose a different text, relying upon “the executive power” in
Article II, to support precisely the opposite conclusion that the President can, in
fact, use his executive power to seize the steel mills.90 Thus we see that the choice
of text here has crucial consequences for the decision: if you pick the “legislative
power,” like Justice Black, the interpreter rejects the President’s decision as
unconstitutional; if you pick the “executive power,” like the dissenters, the
interpreter affirms the President’s decision as constitutional. Whether one calls
this “interpretation” or “construction,” it seems rather clear that the very
“choice” of text matters to the ultimate decision of the case. If that is correct,

86. See Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM.
L. REV. 53, 64 (1953) (criticizing the doctrine as stated in Justice Black’s opinion as “a purely arbitrary
construct”); Paul G. Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President and the Supreme Court,
51 MICH. L. REV. 141, 180–81 (1952) (criticizing Justice Black’s opinion because “it is doubtful whether
such a clear and sharp distinction between legislative and executive functions can always be drawn”);
see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation
of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 23–24 (1998) (discussing the differing formalist and
functionalist views among the Justices in Steel Seizure); Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets Youngstown:
National Security and the Administrative State, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1917, 1925–26 (2012) (noting Justice
Black’s opinion but discussing lawmaking as a function of administrative agencies).
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
88. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 588–89 (emphasis added).
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
90. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 587.
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then originalists and textualists must have a theory of the choice of text if they
are to establish a neutral interpretive zone.
B. Contesting Justice Black’s Pragmatic Enrichments of “Legislative”
Power
Opening the window to other texts allows us to test whether Justice Black’s
purported “pragmatic enrichment” is a contested enrichment, including whether
looking at the whole text negates or cancels91 Justice Black’s enrichment. That
Article I limits itself to enumerated powers “herein granted” challenges the
notion of exclusivity, where exclusivity means that “every imaginable
legislative-type power” is given to Congress.92 Article I also challenges the
notion suggested by exclusivity that only Congress holds legislative power.
Article I gives the President power to veto legislation.93 In other words, the
President and the Congress share this most important “legislative power”—they
must agree on all legislation. Lest one still insist on “exclusivity” as a proper
pragmatic enrichment, any student of the full Constitution knows that the
President and the Senate “share” power in many important matters, including
appointments to the executive, appointments to the judiciary, and the treaty
power.94
The full text of the Constitution thus negates Justice Black’s enriched
meaning—that the Congress has exclusive legislative power. This may well
explain why Justice Black’s interpretation has not held up well over time, and
Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence offers a powerful rejoinder. Justice
Jackson’s famous tripartite test depends upon the idea of “shared power” as a
baseline. When the President and Congress agree, says Justice Jackson, the
President has the greatest power; when they disagree, each must rely upon its
own powers.95 The model here is Article I, Section 7, the Bicameralism Clause,
which provides for Congressional passage and Presidential veto.96 When the
91. One might argue that to fully “cancel” a pragmatic inference, there must be precise semantic
content directly contrary to the inference. If the inference is “she is a bad student,” cancellation requires
the precise semantic content that “she is a good student.” The question of cancellation may then hang
upon how one expresses the pragmatic inference. In Justice Black’s case, the inference is exclusivity;
cancellation would, under this approach, require that the Constitution expressly state, “legislative power
is not exclusive.” My own view is that this is too narrow a view of cancellation. For example, the
Constitution does not say “legislative power is not exclusive,” but it does grant legislative power (the
veto) to the President. Put in other words, the Constitution does what the enrichment denies. This
explains my use of the term “negation.”
92. The powers assigned to Congress do not only exist in Article I: In Article III, for example,
the Congress is given power to create lower courts and to define the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction, U.S. CONST. art. III; similarly, Article IV allows Congress the power to regulate territories,
U.S. CONST. art. IV.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3.
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (appointments and treaty power shared with the Senate).
95. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
96. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United
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branches agree, there is law; when not, there is only a bill or a presidential
statement. Justice Jackson’s “shared power” view and the texts that support
“shared power” (the Appointments Clause and the Bicameralism Clause97)
negate one version of Justice Black’s interpretation—that Article I legislative
powers are “exclusive.” Despite Justice Jackson’s overt anti-textualism,98 his
opinion depends upon a fuller and more accurate view of the constitutional text,
even if the choice of executive-legislative agreement as a safe harbor is itself a
contestable proposition.
Notice that the dissenting Justices, like Chief Justice Fred Vinson, also rely
upon pragmatic enrichment. Chief Justice Vinson writes that the President has
“the whole of the” executive power.99 Again, we see pragmatic enrichment: the
text of the Constitution says “the” executive power, not “the whole of the”
executive power. In his concurrence, Justice Jackson rejected this argument
rather quickly, explaining that the dissenters had added to the text of the
Constitution.100 He went on to conclude that Article II negated Chief Justice
Vinson’s (and the government’s) interpretation since there would be no need to
enumerate any particular executive powers—such as the commander-in-chief
power—if, in fact, the Vesting Clause granted “all” or “the whole” executive
power to the President.101
To sum up, we have seen how major Steel Seizure opinions depend upon
pragmatic inference. Justice Black reads Article I as vesting “all” legislative
power in the Congress, but the Constitution does not say that.102 The dissenting
Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Minton read Article II as vesting
“the whole” executive power in the President, but the Constitution does not say
that, either. Justice Jackson offers a more complex interpretation, acknowledging
what appears a logical contradiction but textual truth: that the Constitution both
requires, in some cases, that the President and Congress act together and at the

States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in
which it shall have originated . . . .”).
97. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate . . . [to] appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States . . . .”).
98. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The actual art of governing under
our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches
based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context.”).
99. Id. at 681 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
101. As Professor Steven Calabresi once argued, the notion that Article I powers are limited to
those “herein granted” can be seen by negative implication (its absence from Article II) as suggesting a
more capacious field for executive power. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 14, at 1175–76. Here,
however, I am simply describing Supreme Court cases and their interpretive focus, rather than
considering all forms of linguistic argument in the case of executive power. For an analysis of the more
complex textual arguments made by unitary executivists, see infra Part IV.
102. The Constitution provides for “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . .” U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 1.

22

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1

same time provides, in other cases, independent power to each department. This
is by far the safer and more precise interpretation.103
C. Justice Scalia’s Pragmatic Enrichment in Morrison v. Olson
Justice Black, a liberal, is hardly the only constitutional textualist who has
enriched the meaning of central phrases in the Constitution. Consider Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson, the independent counsel case, a dissent
whose conclusion I applaud104 but whose pronouncements on the meaning of the
text are just as easily seen to be additions to the text, again negated by the full
text.
The independent counsel law permitted Congress to submit a request to the
Attorney General to name a “special counsel” to investigate misconduct in the
executive department. In the post-Watergate era, proponents insisted that the
executive branch should not have the power to investigate itself; there should be
an “independent” investigator. More specifically, Theodore Olson’s case
involved allegations of false testimony before Congress by a high-ranking
Department of Justice official. The specific question was the constitutionality of
the independent counsel law, a very complex statute making it rather easy for the
Congress to investigate executive department personnel based on claims of false
testimony before Congress.
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, upheld
the law on the basis that the independent counsel had not “unduly
trammel[ed] . . . executive authority” because her job was not “so central to the
functioning of the Executive Branch.”105 The idea, presumably, was that the
independent counsel was one prosecutor among many in the Justice Department,
and her prosecution of a government employee would not bring the executive
103. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson C. Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 41 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 346, 347 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2014) (“When an instrument admits two
constructions the one safe, the other dangerous, the one precise the other indefinite, I prefer that which
is safe & precise.”). The implicit argument here, which awaits greater explication, is that an explanation
that includes more text is by definition better than an explication that includes less text.
104. Justice Scalia’s opinion deserves recognition not because of its formalism but because of its
implicit understanding that the statute allowed members of Congress too much power to send their
political enemies to jail. Under the law, Congress could initiate an investigation, which the Attorney
General had no real power to resist. A Congress upset with an official could simply threaten to ask the
Attorney General for an investigation, and given the difficulty of denying that investigation (the
Attorney General had to find that there was “no” reason to investigate), Congress could be fairly sure
that it had the power to call any of its political enemies to court under threat of criminal indictment.
Somehow, this was never very clear to liberals until Republicans used this tactic against President
Clinton: Independent Counsel Ken Starr found Clinton lied about an affair under oath, leading to a failed
impeachment. Put in other words, Justice Scalia was prescient about the statute’s incentives and
operation, its consequentialist, as opposed to formalist, dangers. Victoria Nourse, The Vertical
Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 772–76 (1999); see also Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Independent
Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463, 471–74 (1996) (discussing the role
of politics in application of the statute); Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Interaction Between Impeachment and
the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193, 2195 (1998).
105. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988).
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branch to a halt. In linguistic terms, the Rehnquist approach enriches the text
suggesting that “the executive power” means “not unduly trammeled” executive
power. Justice Scalia’s response to this enrichment quite properly noted that
“unduly trammeled” appears nowhere in the text of the Constitution.
Because of textual economy, both sides of the case ended up enriching the
actual constitutional text. For Justice Scalia, “all” executive power must reside
in the hands of the President. Here are his precise words: “To repeat, Article II,
§ 1, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides: ‘The executive Power shall be vested in
a President of the United States.’ As I described at the outset of this opinion, this
does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power.”106
Again, note the pragmatic enrichment: all of the executive power.107 As Justice
Scalia noted, no one doubted that the independent counsel was exercising
executive power as a prosecutor. It follows then, for him, that the counsel was
violating the Constitution because the President must have “all” executive
power; at the very least, the President must have the power to remove those
exercising executive power.108
D. Contesting Justice Scalia’s Pragmatic Enrichment
Like Justice Black’s enrichment, Justice Scalia’s is negated by the
constitutional text as a whole. As others have written, Justice Scalia’s view of
the Vesting Clause’s “grant of executive power” is “a grant of exclusive
control.”109 As Justice Jackson explained in Steel Seizure, the Constitution does
not say “all” executive power; it says “the” executive power.110 Second, if “all”
means “exclusive,” the President’s veto power exists in Article I, which would
seem to make of it, what Justice Black called it—a “legislative” power,111 even
if held in the hands of the executive. Moreover, the President does not have “all”
power to appoint his subordinates; he shares that power with the Senate, under
the Appointments Clause.112 Whether we like it or not, the constitutional text
does not create simple, hermetically sealed categories of power.

106. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. As Larry Lessig and Cass Sunstein as well as other scholars have noted, this is supposed to
be a textual argument: a “strongly unitary executive is grounded in the Vesting Clause of Article II: ‘The
executive Power shall be vested in a President.’” Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 9–10. Lessig and
Sunstein are speaking here of the “unitary executive” as a theory that puts the President on top of a
hierarchical executive branch. In theory, that is a different claim than that the President has “all”
executive power.
108. This is not a particularly tendentious view of the case. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Toward
a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 76 (2009) (“Justice Scalia’s dissent
relied on the proposition that the President possesses ‘all’ executive power under the Constitution. This
idea, Scalia argues, stems from the Vesting Clause, Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 . . . .”).
109. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640–41 (Jackson, J. concurring).
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Of course, the claim here is more complex. Justice Scalia may say “all”
executive power, but very few scholars are willing to accept that this means the
President can do anything he wants as long as he calls it “executive power.”113
In Morrison, Scalia is using pragmatic enrichment to argue about a specific
statute and a specific constitutional problem. He believes that the President has
“all” power in the sense of hierarchical authority over the executive branch;
therefore, Congress cannot create “independent” entities within the executive
branch. Put in its narrowest compass, Justice Scalia’s reading of the text is that
“all power” means the power to remove “all” executive officers. Of course, as
any student of the “removal power” knows, the Constitution says nothing at all
about the removal power. And, as a result, the removal question has bedeviled
Presidents and the Supreme Court since the Founding, leading to some of the
more memorable constitutional clashes, including impeachment controversies,
in American history.114
To sum up, there is no textual answer to the removal question facing the
Court in Morrison v. Olson.115 There are only textual arguments that put the
thumb on the scale in one direction or another by pragmatic enrichment. The real
issues here lurk behind this veil of linguistic legerdemain. Chief Justice
Rehnquist upheld the independent counsel law because he feared any other ruling
would mean that all independent agencies—from the Federal Reserve Board to
the Securities and Exchange Commission—would become unconstitutional (a
fear that was highly overstated, since the independent counsel could have been
easily distinguished based on the power it gave to Congress). Justice Scalia,
fearful that Congress was using the independent counsel law to punish political
opponents, was correct about the result but much too confident that what he was
applying was in fact the text of the Constitution (“all” executive power) rather
than his personal addition to the text of the Constitution.
E. False Pragmatic Enrichment, the Creation of Hard-Edged Rules, and
Consequences
Once one actually pays attention to what seem like small interpretive
additions to the Constitution’s text, one can see why these interpretations are
attractive. Pragmatic inferences are often terms that appear to have quantitative
references—all, exclusive, only, exactly, whole. Such added terms are likely to
be particularly attractive because they appear objective and hard-edged. They
create bright line rules. Notice, however, that it is pragmatic enrichment that is
113. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 14, at 1177 n.119 (noting that unitary executivists
do not believe that Article II confers inherent power to act without a statute); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven
G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 IOWA
L. REV. 601, 729–30 (2005) (arguing that belief in the unitariness of the executive does not require belief
in an inherent authority to act contra legem).
114. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 174–89 (discussing the impeachment of Andrew
Johnson).
115. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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adding the hardness, the lines, and not the constitutional text. There is a linguistic
pattern here, and it should not go without notice. We will see it again in the next
Part, which turns to the unitary executive, the non-enforcement power, and the
Emoluments Clause.
One of the risks of this kind of small, almost unnoticed addition, is that it
raises the possibility that the interpreter has added a hard-edged pragmatic
inference—not because this is the best interpretation of the text, or even the
historically proper one (the interpreter has not at this stage even referred to
history)—but because of the interpreter’s policy preferences. Judicial decisionmaking, like any other decision-making, can be motivated decision-making,
which is to say it has a tendency toward confirmation bias.116 Let us say, for
example, one believes in a powerful Presidency and is skeptical of government
bureaucracy, then one might easily find oneself adding a very small word, “all”
in front of “executive power,” convinced that one is applying the constitutional
text even if this is not in fact the text of the Constitution. Reverse the political
presumption: assume one is fearful that the President will take on too much
power. It is not too hard to imagine the interpreter almost unconsciously adding
the word “all” to legislative power as Justice Black did to support his claim that
the President was legislating. In neither case is the interpreter using the actual
text of the Constitution. Instead, in apparently small—but absolutely crucial—
ways, the interpreter is injecting the interpreter’s preferences into the text of the
Constitution, justifying it all the while by the hard edges the interpreter has
herself added to the text.
As we will see in Part IV, there is more at stake here than a few small words.
On these words hangs much. I hope no Justice or constitutionalist really believes
that the President has “all” power. But large consequences can depend upon the
misuse of language in judicial opinions. We all know the history of the Bush
administration’s use of these theories in the War on Terror, when the Office of
Legal Counsel wrote opinions that appeared to assume that the President did in
fact have “all” executive power.117 When in doubt, lawyers will look at these
phrases and wonder just how far they can push the meaning of “executive
power.” This is not a matter of mere theory; liberals and conservatives have cited
the phrase “all” executive power in dissents and majority opinions in the
Supreme Court both before and after Morrison.118 The good news is that it is not

116. See VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 103–34 (2016)
(detailing the cognitive risks of interpretation).
117. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002).
118. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 471 (1998) (noting that “provisions that . . . vest
all ‘executive’ power in the President” have been “interpreted . . . generously” by the Court); Touby v.
United States, 500 U.S. 160, 168 (1991) (noting that “[t]he Constitution vests all executive power in the
President”); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “Article II, § 1, cl. 1, of the
Constitution provides: ‘The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States’” and
that “this does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power”); Youngstown
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actually the text of the Constitution; the bad news is that too few seem to have
noticed.
IV.
EMOLUMENTS, REMOVAL, AND THE NON-ENFORCEMENT POWER
Pragmatic enrichment is not limited to judicial opinions. Textualist and
originalist scholars who write about executive power engage in similar processes
of textual insemination, injecting their preferred inferences and purposes into the
constitutional text. In this Part, I consider various controversies about executive
power—from the President’s power to refuse to enforce the law to the
Emoluments Clause—to show how originalist claims about executive power
depend upon pragmatic enrichment of the text (in short, deviations from the
actual text). Most importantly, I focus on the choice of text, which particular
word or words are chosen for interpretation. Choice is important here because it
precedes any pragmatic enrichment. Textualism, as currently practiced, requires
that one pick a relevant applicable clause, or clauses, or paragraphs. That unit of
analysis, as we will see, can yield apparent pragmatic enrichments that may be
false—or at least falsifiable—by opening up the textual economy, by giving full
faith to the full text. Moreover, as we will see, this isolationist method tends to
yield falsely precise results by adding hard-edged terms or suggesting all-ornothing results. By limiting the information economy to a few words or isolating
a particular word, textualists and originalists have assumed a methodology that
forces them to add and subtract information to make sense of any text.
A. The Foreign Emoluments Clause
Consider the now-important battle over the otherwise ignored Foreign
Emoluments Clause. The Constitution states: “no person holding any Office of
Profit or Trust under [the United States], shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, accept any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever,
from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”119 Long before this issue arose as a
public question with regard to the current President, scholars had staked out
positions on this matter.120 At least one constitutional textualist/originalist
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 681 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he
whole of the ‘executive Power’ is vested in the President”).
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States:
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King,
Prince, or foreign State.”).
120. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 182 (2005)
(“[T]he more general language of Article I, section 9 barred all federal officers, from the president on
down, from accepting any ‘present’ or ‘Emolument’ of ‘any kind whatever’ from a foreign government
without special congressional consent.”); John Manning, Response, Not Proved: Some Lingering
Questions About Legislative Succession to the Presidency, 48 STAN. L. REV. 141, 146 (1995) (“The
Presidency is surely an ‘‘Office under the United States.’”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional
Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1772 (2009) (implying that the President
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argued that the clause did not even apply to the President because the clause says
“Office,” and based on a survey of the use of the term “office” throughout the
Constitution, the term “office” typically applies to unelected members of the
executive branch, not the President.121 He claimed that many other scholars,
originalists and others, agreed with the position that “office” means the same
thing throughout the Constitution.122 More recently, the President’s lawyers,
claiming allegiance to original meaning,123 have asserted that, even if the clause
does apply to the President, it only covers emoluments from “offices.”124
First, let us take the argument that the clause does not apply to the President.
This is a classic form of textual gerrymandering—an argument that takes text out
of context to create a new meaning.125 Let us assume that, in some parts of the
Constitution, the term “office” means a lower ranking, unelected, member of the
executive branch. The problem comes in moving that definition from one part of
the Constitution (call this the home clause) to another part (the receiving clause).
Once isolated from the home clause, the term “office” is recontextualized within
the receiving clause. If the home clause only covers unelected officials, then the
falls within the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption
Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 366 (2009) (“Foreign corruption of the Executive was a concern
as well, as we saw in the Foreign Gifts Clause.”). But see Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the
Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 399, 411–12 (2012)
(arguing that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not apply to the President or the Vice President).
121. Tillman, supra note 120, at 411–17. For more recent and far more comprehensive claims
about the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses, see Andy S. Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments
Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2902391 [https://perma.cc/MXL5-T93J]; (offering a broad discussion of how
both the foreign and domestic emoluments clauses treat the President as well as perspective on the
implications for President Trump’s business dealings); Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of
(forthcoming
2017),
“Emoluments”
in
the
Constitution,
52
GA. L. REV.
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2911871 [https://perma.cc/L4RT-NWQY]. The Justice Department has
adopted an argument similar to the claims made by Grewal and Natelson, one which John Mikhail
concludes is “inaccurate, unrepresentative, and misleading.” John Mikhail, The Definition of
“Emolument” in English Language and Legal Dictionaries, 1523–1806, at 1 (June 30, 2017)
(unpublished draft), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2995693 [https://perma.cc/TH3R-Y85Q] [hereinafter
Mikhail, Definition].
122. According to Tillman, other scholars, including Professors Steven Calabresi, Josh Chafetz,
John Manning, Michael Paulsen, and Saikrishna Prakash, embrace the position that “all office-related
language means the same thing,” Tillman, supra note 120, at 420 n.55 (emphasis removed). I have not
attempted to verify that statement as it could apply to many claims about “office” in the Constitution.
Originalist Will Baude has lauded Tillman’s project to find that “office” must mean the same thing
throughout the Constitution. William Baude, Constitutional Officers: A Very Close Reading, JOTWELL
(July
28,
2016),
http://conlaw.jotwell.com/constitutional-officers-a-very-close-reading
[https://perma.cc/B7Q8-XZLP]. To be fair, Tillman also relies upon various historical claims, but this
simply illustrates the problems with using a pragmatically enhanced text as a baseline for historical
research. Tillman, supra note 120, at 411–17.
123. “The scope of any constitutional provision is determined by the original public meaning of
the Constitution’s text.” MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE
PRESIDENT 4 (2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3280261/MLB-White-Paper-1-10Pm.pdf [https://perma.cc/V77Y-2XXU] [hereinafter MORGAN LEWIS WHITE PAPER].
124. Id.
125. For the equivalent of this in statutory interpretation, see Nourse, supra note 15.
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receiving clause is now deemed to cover unelected officials. Such inferences,
however, can rewrite the Constitution. The transferred home context effectively
amends the new receiving context—the Foreign Emoluments Clause—by
inserting the term “unelected.” Of course, that is not the actual text of the
Constitution. The term “unelected” does not exist in the Foreign Emoluments
Clause; it has been added by the interpreter.
Under “analytic textualism,” one asks whether a pragmatic addition such
as “unelected” is falsified by any other text in the Constitution. And, yes, there
is powerful evidence that the President can be covered by the term “Office.” No
one doubts that the President can be impeached. And so, no one should doubt
that the term “Office” in the Foreign Emoluments Clause can easily be
interpreted to cover an elected official like the President. Article II, Section 4
provides that the President “shall be removed from Office by Impeachment” for
“high crimes and [m]isdemeanors.”126 Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 provides that
the “Judgement in cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal
from Office.”127 This falsification procedure allows us to see that the claimed
textual enrichment is not the “only possible” interpretation; in fact, it is not a
terribly plausible enrichment at all: even President Trump’s lawyers now admit
that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does in fact cover the President.128
Second, let us turn to the President’s emoluments-from-office
interpretation, applying the same method.129 The argument is that the Foreign
Emoluments Clause does not apply to President Trump because the only
emoluments covered are benefits coming from a foreign office.130 Notice the
126. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for . . . high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit
under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment,
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”).
128. MORGAN LEWIS WHITE PAPER, supra note 123, at 4. It is worth noting that by invoking this
comparison, I am not repeating “borrowing” errors. My claim is not that the impeachment clauses use
the term “Office,” therefore the term “Office” in the Foreign Emoluments Clause must include the
President. I am using that clause to negate a hypothesized interpretation, not to demand a particular
textual reading.
129. Professor Natelson argues that the “original meaning” of the emoluments clause requires
“compensation with financial value, received by reason of public employment.” Natelson, supra note
121 at 1. Professor Grewal appears to concur with Natelson’s view, although he is not focused on
historical evidence. In both cases, their textual methodology depends upon comparing the Foreign
Emoluments Clause with other instances of “emolument” in the Constitution. I believe that this
methodology fails because its choice of text—the single word emolument—is faulty (reducing the
information economy too narrowly) and assumes that which it is trying to prove (that emolument in the
domestic sphere must mean the same thing in the foreign sphere). There is no reason to assume, ex ante,
that the clauses in which the term “emolument” appears use the term in precisely the same way. As
originalists themselves avow, text takes its meaning from context, and the contexts of the compared
clauses are quite different. See infra discussion at notes 138–140 (comparing the overall purposes of the
domestic and foreign emoluments clauses).
130. Nothing in this Article presumes to be a comprehensive review of the emoluments literature,
which since the initial draft of this Article has grown exponentially. My point is that the President’s
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pragmatic addition to the text: “only-emoluments-from-office.” Just as we have
seen in earlier additions, there are new terms added—“from office”—and they
are made exclusive and hard-edged—emoluments “only . . . from office.” As we
have also seen, this interpretation gains its power from isolating the term
“Emolument” from the rest of the clause.
If we open up the interpretive window just a bit, the proposed pragmatic
enrichments falter as plausible readings. First, the enriched “emolument from
office” interpretation makes the clause implausibly redundant (“emolument from
office, office”). Second, since the President cannot accept a foreign “Office” in
any event, that prohibition presumptively includes foreign office benefits,
effectively eliminating the term “emolument” in such cases. Third, and most
importantly, the addition of exclusivity (“only emoluments from office”) renders
other terms surplusage. “[P]resents . . . of any kind whatever”131 surely includes
uncompensated foreign benefits132 given to the President that are not given to
others.133
Just as we saw in the earlier “the-President-is-not-covered” argument, the
“emolument-from-office” argument depends upon strained inferences drawn
from other constitutional texts.134 The term “Emolument” has been taken out of
two home clauses and redefined as “only-emolument-from-office” in the
receiving Foreign Emoluments Clause. The home clauses are: (1) the Domestic
Incompatibility Clause, which bars members of Congress from assuming “any
civil Office created, or . . . the Emoluments whereof shall have been

arguments on emoluments, like other arguments we see in this Article, do not depend upon the text of
the Constitution but upon meaning added to the Constitution, here “emoluments from office.”
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. This Article assumes, for sake of argument, that benefits to the
President’s businesses are in fact benefits attributable to the President. The clause may suggest to the
contrary since it applies to “persons.”
132. Samuel Johnson’s eighteenth century dictionary defines “present” as “a gift; a donative
something ceremonially given; a letter or mandate exhibited.” Present, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (Samuel Johnson ed., 1755). In turn it defines “gift” as “[a] thing given or bestowed; the act
of giving; oblation; offering; the right or power of bestowing; power; faculty.” Gift, id. That dictionary
also defines Emolument as “[p]rofit; advantage.” Emolument, id.; see Grewal, supra note 121, at 4 n.10
(noting that the “office-related definition” became the principal definition by the end of the nineteenth
century, but that the more general definition of “benefit” is found in the 1755 classic). This suggests, of
course, that the “office” meaning is not in fact the “original” meaning. For a more comprehensive
analysis, see Mikhail, Definition, supra note 121.
133. For example, governments that provide tax, trademark, or other benefits to the President
alone would presumably be giving “presents” to the President, requiring congressional approval. Lest
someone claim that these would not be covered because they are intangible presents, the term
“emolument” has traditionally been used to cover intangible as well as tangible benefits. See, e.g.,
Natelson, supra note 121 at 13–14 (defining emoluments to include a soldier’s right to forage or a
seaman’s right to obtain booty from ship captures as long as these benefits could be “convertible to
money”).
134. Natelson, who looks at historical definitions, does not confine his study to foreign
emoluments but uses references to domestic emoluments to support his claim that the historical meaning
of the term is best read as emolument-from-office. See id. at 13–16.
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[i]ncreased”;135 and (2) the Compensation Clause, which guarantees the
President’s compensation during his term of office and prohibits him from
“receiv[ing] within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or
any of them.”136 From these clauses, the President’s lawyers infer that foreign
emoluments must come from an “office.” Since the home clauses address offices,
it is assumed that the receiving clauses address offices,137 even when the clauses
address entirely different subject-matter.
To put it bluntly: the home clauses have nothing to do with foreign affairs.
The Incompatibility Clause focuses on the entirely domestic relationship of the
President and Congress.138 House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi or Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell may not simultaneously sit in the Congress
and as Cabinet members. Nor may they create new offices in the executive
branch, raise the pay of those offices, and then benefit from that pay raise.
Equally focused on domestic affairs, the Presidential Compensation Clause bars
legislative bribery. As Benjamin Franklin once explained, one of the defects of
the Pennsylvania state constitution was that every time the Governor approved a
bill, he would exact a payment from the legislature.139 Legislation was
“purchased” with the increase of the Governor’s salary. The Framers viewed140
these clauses as central to the separation of powers;141 they do nothing to address
foreign influence over the President.
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which
he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall
have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been [i]ncreased during such time; and no
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office.”).
136. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (“The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services,
a Compensation, which shall neither be [i]ncreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall
have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United
States, or any of them.”). The idea here is that the President will be receiving other compensation from
his service in the “office” of the presidency.
137. It seems to me to make perfect sense to read the presidential Compensation Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7, as applying to benefits from office because it says “he shall not receive within
that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.” In short, the clause
“Emolument from the United States,” implies that the emolument comes from an “office,” at a
minimum, although it also includes other government payments. By contrast, the Foreign Emoluments
Clause provides that no person may accept “any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind
whatever” from a foreign government. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. In the first case, the term
“Emolument” is explicitly modified by a term suggesting “office”—from the United States—in the latter
case it appears in a list separated from the term “Office.”
138. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
139. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 99 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
(statement of Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania, June 4, 1787).
140. See Victoria Nourse, Toward A “Due Foundation” for the Separation of Powers: The
Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447, 459–61 (1996) (discussing pervasive
concern during the founding era about the corruption of government leaders and the debate at the
Constitutional Convention about the President’s independence).
141. Id. at 450–52 (describing the “‘due foundation’ for the separation of powers [as] a
foundation built upon the independence of persons”); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen,
One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045,
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Lest this all seem too abstract, consider the strange results these borrowing
maneuvers create. Under the President’s interpretation, the only cases that the
term “Emolument” would cover would be something like this situation: the
British government gives the President the fringe benefits of an office like the
Earldom of Ipswich (e.g. the use of the castle and golf course).142 Of course, it is
important that the President not be given the title “Earl of Ipswich” because that
is already barred by the clause. Even then, however, it is not clear why these
benefits would not be barred as a “present:” a gift “of any kind” bestowed on the
President by a foreign government. The only way one eliminates “present” from
the Foreign Emoluments Clause is by isolating and focusing so hard on the term
“Emolument” that one forgets the rest of the clause.
The proper interpretive approach refuses to add meaning to the text. The
term “emolument” is ambiguous: at the Founding, emolument meant both
“benefit” in a general sense and “benefit from an office.”143 Once we stop
focusing on that particular term and turn to the clause as a whole, three things
seem clear. First, as we have seen, the clause is redundant. If the President is
named the Earl of Ipswich and accepts the benefits of that office, that action is
covered four times—as a present, office, emolument, and title. Second, the
clause errs on the side of over-, rather than under-, inclusion. It applies to “any
present, Emolument . . . Title, of any kind whatever.”144 Third, Congress is
assigned the ultimate power to determine its effect. Even if a court were to err in
finding that something constituted an “Emolument,” the clause would give
Congress power to allow the President to accept it.145 Altogether, these textual
features counsel against a narrow interpretation. At the very least, courts should
reject any purported “originalist” argument that gerrymanders meaning, both
adding and subtracting from the Constitution’s text.

1050–52, 1062–65 (1994) (arguing that “separation of personnel” is necessary for separation of powers
and that these clauses resulted in “reinforc[ing] . . . the separation of powers”).
142. See, e.g., Natelson, supra note 121, at 13 (describing “Definition No. 1” as “fringe
benefits”); id. at 13 (“Perhaps the most frequent meaning [of ‘fringe benefits’] in political discourse was
also the narrowest.”). But see Emolument, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Samuel
Johnson ed., 1755) (defining “emolument” as “[p]rofit; advantage”).
143. See e.g., Address to the People of Great Britain (Oct. 21, 1774), in 1 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774, at 84 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904–1937) (“You [the British
people] restrained our [American] trade in every way that could conduce to your emolument.”); see
Natelson, supra note 121, at 12–20 (describing four meanings including “all benefits” and writing that
“All four [definitions] were very common”).
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
145. This was a significant change from the Clause as it appears in the Articles of Confederation
where it did not allow for congressional approval. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para.
1. George Mason famously declared that he could not sign a constitution in which Congress could in
fact allow a President to serve in a foreign office. George Mason, Speech at the Convention of Virginia
(June 15, 1788), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 483 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827), https://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=lled&fileName=003/lled003.db&recNum=495&itemLink=D%3Fhlaw%3A1%3A
.%2Ftemp%2F~ammem_UEDc%3A%3A%230030496&linkText=1 [https://perma.cc/T38N-8LMC].
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B. Removal and Pragmatic Enrichment
Can the President remove his subordinates based on whim, political
preference, or hair color? Unitary executivists say “yes,” on the theory that
Congress may not limit the President by requiring that he show “good cause” to
terminate executive branch officers. The removal power often seems technical
to many students of the Constitution, but originalist work urges that the
President’s power to remove officers implies something very important about
the administrative state. Supporters of the unitary executive believe that making
the President the hierarchical head of the executive will mean that so-called
“independent” agencies are unconstitutional.146 There are real-world
consequences to this problem. If the unitary executivists are right, the President
can fire the head of the Office of Government Ethics or the head of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, despite the fact that Congress permits dismissal
only after a term of years or for good reasons.147
As noted earlier, the classic originalist treatment decries opponents of the
unitary executive for failing to pay sufficient attention to the text of the
Constitution. Originalists argue that their opponents are wrong in asserting a
fourth “administrative” power, when the Constitution only provides for three
departments.148 Put in other words, they argue that their opponents are enriching
the Constitution’s text with added meaning. And, indeed, if the argument really
was that there was some “fourth” power, that would be an inappropriate
enrichment. (As we have seen in the case of Justice Black’s opinion in Steel
Seizure, liberal textualists are not immune from criticism that they too add to the
text). One rather obvious problem with this argument, however, is the
assumption that “administrative” means something other than “executive.” To
execute is to administer.149 Let us imagine that the Vesting Clause read, “the
146. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 4 (arguing that, under the unitary executive theory,
“congressional efforts to insulate executive branch subordinates from presidential control by creating
independent agencies and counsels are in essence unconstitutional”).
147. 5 U.S.C. App. 4 § 401 (2012) (the head of the Office of Government Ethics to serve a fiveyear term). The Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau serves for a term of five years
and may only be removed for cause. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c) (2012) (The President may remove the Director
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office). Other statutes that include a “good faith”
cause requirement include the head of the Federal Trade Commission. See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
148. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 547 (responding to Lessig & Sunstein); cf. Lessig &
Sunstein, supra note 32, at 118 (arguing that the Framers “did not believe that the President must have
plenary power over all we now think of as administration”).
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam149. Administer,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
webster.com/dictionary/administer [https://perma.cc/XH4J-K6NS] (defining administer as “to manage
or supervise the execution, use, or conduct of”); Administer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER THESAURUS,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/administer [https://perma.cc/AM3T-L4JN] (listing
“execute” as a synonym for “administer”); Execute, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/execute
[https://perma.cc/6YR4-AZWS]
(listing
“administer”
as
a
synonym
for
“execute”);
Administer,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/administer [https://perma.cc/6Y5E-NQJL] (listing “execute” as a
synonym for “administer”); Execute, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/execute
[https://perma.cc/U8Y4-5SW2] (listing “administer” as a synonym for “execute”).
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President shall have executive-but-not-administrative power.” This sentence is
self-contradicting.150
Even if there were a difference between execution and administration, the
unitary executive claim would remain one of pragmatic enrichment. Defenders
of the unitary executive explain that the Constitution provides three departments
and therefore there are only three kinds of power.151 Of course the number three
can in theory be “at least” three or “at most” three or “perhaps more than”
three.152 It is no surprise that this kind of enrichment—adding an “exclusivity”
term—has surfaced once again. We have seen this with Justice Black’s
pragmatic inference in Steel Seizure (“all” legislative power). We have seen this
with Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson (“all” executive power).153 We
have seen this in the President’s interpretation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause
(“only” from office). In each case, the hard-edged nature of the rule has been
created by the interpreter, not by the text itself.
Since the Constitution’s text does not address removal,154 the textual
argument for removal is a hypothesized interpretation (“all executive power”
includes removal). Since this is a hypothesis, it must be tested against the rest of
the Constitution. Measured in such a fashion, the hypothetical interpretation
fails. The Necessary and Proper Clause provides Congress with at least some
power to structure the administration in ways that do not preclude “proper”
limitations. If Congress has some power to limit the President’s removal power,
then the hypothetical interpretation—“all power”—should fail as an
interpretation that considers the entire text.
In an important set of articles, John Mikhail has argued, for example, that
the “necessary and proper clauses” “cancel” the exclusivity inference that many
have drawn from a listing of legislative enumerated powers under Article I,
Section 8. As Mikhail explains, there are three “necessary and proper clauses,”
the first referring to Congress’s own powers enumerated in Section 8,155 the
second providing Congress with the power to implement “all other [p]owers”
granted to the federal government under the Constitution,156 and the third
150. Interestingly Professor Prakash in an earlier student comment called the unitary executive
theory the “Chief Administrator Theory.” See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief
Administrator: The Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 991–92
(1992).
151. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in
a President of the United States of America.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court . . . .”).
152. See Soames, supra note 57, at 451–53.
153. See supra Part III.
154. Unitary executivists sometimes concede this point. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 2, at 224
(describing the removal power as an “unspecified” power deriving from the Vesting Clause).
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . .”).
156. Id. (“[A]nd all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States . . . .”).

34

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1

granting Congress the power to implement “all other powers” vested by the
Constitution in any “Department or officer” of the United States.157 The
President’s power to execute the law falls within “other powers” granted to the
federal government and/or an “officer” of the United States under the
Constitution. That, in turn, gives Congress the power to assist the President in
his enumerated power to faithfully execute the law. At the very least, it cancels
the pragmatic enrichment that Congress has no power whatsoever to shape the
executive branch.158
If this is correct, whatever hypothetical inference unitary executivists draw
from Article II’s Vesting Clause may be canceled or at least negated by the
“third” “necessary and proper clause.” The pragmatic inference, remember, is
that the President has “all” executive power where “all” means “all executive
power to nullify, remove, or otherwise control” executive officers (including
those Congress seeks to protect from purely political dismissal).159 Under the
third necessary and proper clause, Congress has the power to create entities that
assist the executive. The executive is a “Department or officer” vested with
power under the Constitution to execute the law and thus Congress has the power
to assist in implementation by providing institutions and offices to aid the
executive. Since the Founding, Congress has acted to create such institutions, as
for example, when Congress created the Department of the Treasury and the
Department of State.160 Originalists insist that this aid must be limited to an
enumerated executive power,161 but in fact there is an enumerated executive
power—the power to faithfully execute the laws.162 After all, if Congress did not
create such entities, would we really expect the President himself to be collecting
customs duties or litigating cases? The President needs institutions, and officers,
to help him or her execute the law.
The only real textual limit on Congress’s power to assist the President in
execution is that the law must be “proper.”163 It seems fairly easy, however, to
argue that it is proper to restrain Presidents from removing the heads of
departments for purely arbitrary or partisan reasons. If Congress, for example,
wants to maintain market or legal stability across administrations and to ensure
this by preventing dismissal of officers for political or arbitrary reasons, that
presumably is a “proper” reason because it aids in the execution of the law (as
157. Id. (“[O]r in any Department or Officer thereof.”); John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper
Clauses, 102 GEO. L. J. 1045, 1046–47 (2014).
158. See Mikhail, supra note 157, at 1056 (arguing that the “all other Powers” language was
“presumably intended to give Congress whatever instrumental power it needed to organize and regulate
the other branches and agencies of the government”).
159. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 599 (arguing that “the President must be able to control
subordinate executive officers through the mechanisms of removal, nullification, and execution of the
discretion ‘assigned’ to them himself”).
160. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 25.
161. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 589.
162. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
163. See Prakash, supra note 150, at 1009–11.
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opposed to arbitrary decision-making).164 This does not mean that there might
not be other limits on Congress’s structuring of agencies. As I have argued
elsewhere, Congress cannot, for example, require that the Senate “approve” of
the President’s decision to remove an officer. If that were true, the Senate would
have enormous power over the executive branch, forcing the President to retain
officers at the whim of a filibustering Senate minority. That much is very clear
from history; Madison warned that such a practice would cause the executive
branch to slide into the Congress.165 Limiting the President’s removal to “good
faith” reasons for dismissing the head of a Commission or Board, however, is a
far cry from an attempt by Congress to insinuate its members into positions
within the executive branch or holding up the President’s removal by requiring
Senate approval.166
To sum up, the unitary executive argument hinges on a reading of Article
II that depends upon an inference that adds text to the Constitution—that there
are only three departments. Analytic textualism asks whether this hypothesis is
negated by other texts in the Constitution. The answer is that the necessary and
proper clauses provide Congress the power to shape the executive branch in ways
that assist the President in enforcing the law.167 At the very least, these clauses
negate the claim that the text of the Constitution demands the unitary executive
theory, and expose it as a creation of the interpreter, not the text.
C. Non-Enforcement Power
During the Obama administration, originalists claimed that the
administration was acting unconstitutionally by failing to enforce immigration
law, specifically, that executive actions regarding Dreamers and their parents168
164. Unitary executivists concede that the Necessary and Proper Clause “enables Congress to
assist the President in the fulfillment of his constitutional duties,” Prakash, supra note 150, at 1011, but
argue that it does not permit the creation of an “independent agency,” because that would be improper,
id. Part of the problem here is that the argument fails to explain what is precisely meant by an
“independent agency,” which is to say an agency whose head can only be removed by the President for
misconduct in office, barring what are purely political or arbitrary dismissals, or one whose head has a
fixed term. Critics claim that the Congress cannot restrict the President’s discretion. That claim simply
assumes what it is trying to prove—that the President has unlimited constitutional power of removal.
See also Prakash, supra note 2, at 233 (citing for a similar proposition, Gary Lawson & Patricia B.
Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping
Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 333–34 (1993)). In any event, my argument here is only that the assumption
of “all” executive power to remove is an invention of a nonexistent textual power.
165. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 113–16 (1926). President Andrew Johnson was
impeached because he failed to abide by the Tenure of Office Act which required that Congress approve
of the President’s decision to remove a Cabinet official.
166. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 140, at 517–18 (arguing that Madison did not believe the
Senate should have a role in removal but approved Congress’s limitation on the tenure of offices, such
as the office of the Comptroller General).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
168. The Obama administration issued an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
memorandum allowing the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to not
enforce the removal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) against individuals known
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were unconstitutional. At the time, originalists Robert Delahunty and John Yoo
argued that the text of the Constitution required the President to act and nonenforcement of the immigration laws was therefore unconstitutional.169 In short,
if Delahunty and Yoo are correct, the originalist position would suggest that
President Trump may not decline to enforce domestic law. This is likely to cause
liberals to find originalism on non-enforcement suddenly more appealing than it
was during the Obama years. Nevertheless, this position, like the ones we have
seen before on emoluments and removal depends upon pragmatic enrichment of
the text.
Delahunty and Yoo’s textual argument begins with the “Take Care Clause.”
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution states that the President
“shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” They emphasize that the
clause takes the “imperative” form, using the term “shall.” Invoking Dr. Samuel
Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, Delahunty and Yoo argue
“Johnson defines the meanings of the adverb ‘faithfully’ to include both ‘[w]ith
strict adherence to duty and allegiance’ and ‘[w]ithout failure of performance;
honestly; exactly.’” They conclude: The Take Care Clause is thus naturally read
as an instruction or command to the President to put the laws into effect, or at
least to see that they are put into effect, “without failure” and “exactly.”170
The pragmatic enrichment here is obvious: the authors have added the term
“exactly” (a hard-edged additive) to the Take Care Clause. Under “analytic
textualism,” one looks to see whether any other clause falsifies that inference.
One immediate textual answer against such an enrichment comes from the term
“faithfully.” “Faithfully” assumes, in my view, that exactitude is not in fact
required; honest good faith efforts may fail. Even fiduciaries may make mistakes,
as long as they honestly seek to further their client’s interest.171 Samuel
as “Dreamers.” That term refers to undocumented students who would have benefited from the
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. USCIS was authorized to do so
through “deferred action,” an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo,
Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and
the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 786–89 (2013). The Obama administration subsequently
expanded the deferred action criteria to apply to the parents of citizens and legal permanent residents of
the United States. Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in Immigration
Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 92 (2016).
169. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 168, at 784.
170. Interestingly enough, Delahunty and Yoo actually deploy a kind of canceling logic when
considering this claim and the meaning of the Vesting Clause. They believe the Vesting Clause confers
“the entirety” of executive power on the President. One might then ask why one would need the Take
Care Clause. They posit that the Vesting Clause includes a power to suspend or refuse to enforce law
that the Take Care Clause “dispels.” Id. at 799–800.
171. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing the fiduciary obligations of
corporate directors and officers and noting that “a corporate officer who makes a mistake in
judgment . . . will rarely, if ever, be found liable”); Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and
Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753, 1770 (2016); Joseph K. Leahy, A Decade After
Disney: A Primer on Good and Bad Faith, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 859, 889–90 (2015) (noting that courts
will not assume bad faith when a corporation’s board of directors makes a mistake but will instead
presume good faith absent evidence to the contrary).
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Johnson’s ancient dictionary, invoked for its pragmatic enrichment, is not
definitive on this matter.172 Supporting this argument—against enriching the text
with the term “exactly”—is the Presidential Oath Clause, which seems to cancel
any notion that President has a duty of precise enforcement, since it requires only
that the President faithfully execute the laws “to the best of” his ability.173
The term “faithfully,” however, has not satisfied a variety of scholars who
argue that the text is complex. Those who support the notion of “exact”
enforcement argue that the veto power suggests that the President has only one
shot at negating a law through Article I, Section 7,174 rather than two shots—one
at signing and then another at the time of enforcement. That argument, however,
does not account for discretionary non-enforcement falling short of an effective
veto. Here again, the textual arguments of those who insist on “exact”
enforcement run into the problem that the terms “executive” power and
“faithfully” execute suggest that there is room for Presidential judgment.175
These terms tend to cancel or at least undermine the claim that interpreters should
effectively add the term “exactly” to the Take Care Clause.
Without creative additions, the text is unlikely to solve the Presidential nonenforcement problem. On the one hand, few believe the President can ignore the
law. As the Supreme Court held in Kendall v. United States in 1838: “To contend
that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed,
implies a power to forbid their execution; is a novel construction of the
constitution, and is entirely inadmissible.”176 The Founders had no interest in
granting a President the monarchical equivalent of an ability to “dispense” with
Congress’s laws. As the Kendall court explained:
It would be vesting in the President a dispensing power, which has no
countenance for its support in any part of the constitution; and is
asserting a principle, which, if carried out in its results to all cases falling
within it, would be clothing the President with a power to control the

172. Faithfully, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Samuel Johnson ed., 1755)
(defining “faithfully” as “[s]incerely; with strong promises” and “[h]onestly; without fraud, trick, or
ambiguity”).
173. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“[H]e shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: ‘I do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and
will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’”).
174. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 171, at 1773 (“[A]n executive decision to disregard a
law . . . would grant the President a second veto that the Constitution does not contemplate.”); Zachary
S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 690 (2014) (“Allowing
the President to disregard duly enacted laws . . . would [give] the President a form of second veto over
laws . . . .”).
175. See Bellia, supra note 171, at 1756 (noting that “one can view the clause as discretiongranting: in conferring or recognizing the President’s power to ‘execute[]’ the law, the clause seemingly
embeds some flexibility to decide when and how to exercise that power”); see also DAVID K. NICHOLS,
THE MYTH OF THE MODERN PRESIDENCY 52 (1994) (noting that “to the extent that the execution of the
law requires discretion, the exercise of that discretion is under the control of the President”).
176. 37 U.S. 524, 525 (1838).
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legislation of congress, and paralyze the administration of justice.177
These statements, however, do not settle the textual question. To arrive at
“exact” enforcement, the interpreter must add meaning to the text of the Take
Care Clause, yielding an inference that is negated by other text. In the absence
of a clear text, the most we can say of the non-enforcement power is that the
devil is likely to end up in the details: one must ask precisely what the President
is “not” enforcing. If the President refuses to enforce a “mandatory” duty, there
are good arguments that the President, in domestic affairs, must comply with
Congress’s mandatory statute.178 When the statute provides the President with
discretion, however, then the answer may well be different. The President surely
has power to direct his Cabinet to exercise discretion when in fact Congress has
provided discretion. In any future case, it will be up to courts to determine
whether the action amounts to “faithful” execution or “blithe” ignorance.
V.
ANALYTIC TEXTUALISM DEFENDED AND THEORIZED
So far, I have highlighted how originalist interpreters, whether judges or
scholars, add meaning to the text by pragmatic enrichments that suggest “hardedged,” rule-like qualities that do not exist in the text of the Constitution or may
be falsified by other parts of the Constitution. More generally, I have argued that
interpreters are forced to add and subtract meaning because they artificially limit
the information economy by focusing narrowly on single words ripped from their
context. If one starts by limiting oneself to a word or two, one will be unable to
find meaning without adding or enriching meaning.
In this Part, I defend this approach against objections. First, I defend the
assumption that constitutional interpretation must be consistent with basic rules
governing communication. Second, I explain why “analytic textualism” and
falsifying technique is an improvement over intratextualism, and is consistent
with theories of structural inference or constitutional holism. Third, I explain
why originalists who hope for historical precisification must recognize that their
starting place—the choice of text—may raise significant risks of confirmation
bias and error. If one starts from a false textual inference, then historical evidence
confirming that interpretation does not honor the text; it violates it. Indeed, this
may be one reason why the vast majority of judges have never been
constitutional monists (following text alone) but have embraced pluralistic
modes of reasoning (such as text, structure, history, and consequences) as a
177. Id.
178. See Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers,
112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1231 (2014) (discussing the legislative power of Congress as a limitation on
executive power); John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV.
1, 45–46 (2014) (discussing the relationship between the grant of executive power in Article II and the
Necessary and Proper Clause); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism and
Functionalism in Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments Power After Noel
Canning, 64 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1566 (2015) (noting the existence of mandatory executive duties).
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defense against false textual inferences imposed by an artificial reduction of the
interpretive information economy.
A. The Constitution as Communication
Critics will claim that the Constitution cannot be analyzed as if it were a
casual conversation; it is a far more formal document.179 Formal communications
are still communications—whether issued by a general or by a president. Indeed,
formality suggests we should pay more, rather than less, attention to the text
since it reflects deliberation.180 It would be a sad thing, as Justice Scalia used to
say, if the people could not read their government’s own constitution,181 and
reading, of course, requires communication.
Others will suggest that conversations are liable to wide-ranging
contradictions and digressions not likely to be found in formal documents.
“Analytic textualism” does not assume either logical contradiction or inadvertent
inconsistencies; it assumes the possibility of clarifying hypothesized readings by
asking whether they can be falsified by means of other text. It assumes that a
formal document is likely to express compromises that may not be reflected in
small pieces of text, but require a wider view. It opens the information economy
to test a hypothesized meaning. To make an analogy to a conversation: the theory
assumes that one cannot take a single statement from the conversation but must
look at how the conversation itself clarifies meaning.
Just as conversations proceed by iterative process, drafting of formal
documents proceeds by give-and-take over time. Our Constitution began with
competing drafts. Seriatim discussion of particular parts of the proposed drafts
led to changes. Those changes in turn raised further amendments. Refinements
were issued by committees and referred back to the whole. This is really not so
different from a conversation. Party A proposes a plan to go to lunch. Party B
asks: “Where do you want to go to lunch?” Party A says he wants to go to lunch
at the Restaurant Bis near the Capitol. Party B amends that by saying he would
prefer to go to Alexandria, and so on. Conversation, like drafting, can involve a
good deal of iterative give-and-take to settle on a final plan.
Some have urged that, in constitutional and other contexts, we should adopt
interpretive norms from contract law.182 As Randy Barnett has argued, the
Constitution is not a contract.183 Contracts have the consent of all the parties;
there never has been unanimous consent to our Constitution. But even if the
179. A more sophisticated form of this argument is that Gricean maxims of cooperation should
not prevail in cases of complex formal documents. See Williams, supra note 62, at 542. As noted earlier,
I make no claim that those who debated the Constitution always agreed; they agreed enough to produce
a final text. I also make no claim that Gricean maxims apply. The maxims are not necessary to my
argument.
180. Barnett, supra note 18, at 631.
181. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 46–47 (1997).
182. Baude & Sachs, supra note 40.
183. Barnett, supra note 39, at 616.
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Constitution were a contract, sophisticated interpreters of contracts know that the
words of a document are not enough to give it meaning—inference is necessary.
As contract theorists have argued, “communication” is only possible because of
a “sophisticated process of pragmatic inference.”184 Like all communications,
contract terms can be ambiguous, vague, or otherwise require enrichment by
reference to context or other information. In this sense, my approach is no
different than how an interpreter might interpret a contract.
B. Intratextualism, Structural Inference, and Constitutional Holism
All of this brings me to defend the falsification method I have suggested
when addressing proposed pragmatic inferences. Some might question whether
this approach amounts to “intratextualism,” a term coined by the
constititutionalist Akhil Amar.185 There is a surface similarity in the sense that
both theories seek to understand the text by focusing on the text, rather than on
recourse outside of the text. There is a deeper difference, however:
Intratextualism imagines that similar words or strings of words should be read
similarly or that variation in language is meaningful. This requires judgments
about the similarity or dissimilarity of terms.186 “Analytic textualism” makes no
such assumption, indeed it seeks to interrogate such assumptions, by attempting
to falsify claimed similarity relationships. In this sense, intratextualism and
analytic textualism are opposites: Intratextualism assumes a coherent
document;187 verified, non-reductive textualism does not.188
Intratextualist arguments are fully capable of adding pragmatic meaning
without acknowledging this important fact. As we saw in the discussion of the
Foreign Emoluments Clause, intratextual arguments may be full of pragmatic
enrichments that come from excising particular words from one “home” clause
and moving that enrichment to a different “receiving” clause, where the term
takes on a new meaning. That new meaning may or may not be true, depending
upon underlying judgments of similarity or dissimilarity. So, for example, the
assumption that “office” must mean the same thing throughout the Constitution
leads to the verging-on-silly argument that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does

184. “[B]y harnessing, and then processing, more information than merely the text, more
meaning can be extracted at the other end of the interpretative process. The other information is the
‘context’ . . . .” Adam Kramer, Common Sense Principles of Contract Interpretation (And How We’ve
Been Using Them All Along), 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 177, 184–88 (2003).
185. Amar, supra note 6.
186. Id. at 762 (emphasizing the difference in phraseology as significant to a question involving
interpretation of Article III).
187. Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with
Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 730–31 (2000).
188. One might argue that I have adopted an equally false assumption that the Constitution is not
coherent, simply shifting the burden. Falsifying procedure does not reject real textual coherence, where
it exists. Instead, it aims to test hypothesized meanings that are enrichments of meaning, additions to the
text.
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not apply to the President. Intratextualism depends upon contestable assumptions
of coherence and similarity that need to be defended, not assumed.189
“Analytic textualism” is consistent with, and in fact reinforces, arguments
based on structural relationships created by the constitutional text. Charles Black
famously argued that we should interpret the Constitution to enforce its structure
and relationships.190 Black’s emphasis on constitutional relationships remains
exceedingly important and often misunderstood. “Analytic textualism”
recognizes the importance of those relationships. When one pulls a word or a
couple of words out of the clauses of the Constitution, there is a risk that one will
sever any embedded relationships that might exist elsewhere in the document
across clauses or articles. For example, severing the Vesting Clauses from the
rest of the provisions in Articles I and II gives us a false picture of the President’s
powers as exclusive when we know that, in many important instances, such as
the making of legislation, the President and the Congress share power.
Similarly, “analytic textualism” supports a holistic approach toward the
constitutional text defined as one that recognizes intertemporal relationships.191
Vicki Jackson, among others, has argued that we should read amendments to the
Constitution as amending the whole Constitution, including prior amendments
and provisions in the original framework constitution.192 So, for example, the
Fourteenth Amendment, or at least its values, should be read as modifying the
meaning of the Commerce Clause in cases where commerce and discrimination
intersect.193 Holism, as suggested by Jackson, refuses to pull one amendment out
without looking at later amendments. Nothing in “analytic textualism” rejects
that approach; in fact, to the extent that it is non-reductive, it is fully consistent
with the idea that pragmatic enrichments must be tested against later textual
modifications to the Constitution.

189. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 6, at 773 (discussing glossing in connection with McCulloch v.
Maryland). But see id. at 764 (explaining that Marshall’s textual argument in Marbury v. Madison
assumes that the Original Jurisdiction Clause is exclusive but not explaining this as a pragmatic
enrichment and seeking to confirm this reading by other textual evidence rather than trying to determine
whether it is falsified).
190. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969).
191. There are many ways in which one can interpret interpretive “holism.” Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1962 (2013). Here, I define it
to mean that amendment means amendment of all prior provisions in the original constitution.
192. Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutionalism, and Fiss-ian
Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 265, 270 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 952 (2002) (arguing
for a synthetic reading of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments).
193. Jackson, supra note 192, at 266–67.
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VI.
RECONCEIVING PLURALISM AS CONSTRAINT?
For all of the particularity on which I have defended “analytic textualism,”
no one should think that, in matters of constitutional structure, I believe that this
is the end of any sound constitutional analysis. If anything, I have shown that the
text on key matters involving executive power is vague. I sincerely doubt that, if
in the near future courts are faced with questions of executive power, they will
resort only to text, rather than the standard multi-modal argument in which they
look at text, history, structure, and consequences to interpret a text.
My own theory of the separation of powers requires that courts consider
deeply the consequences of their actions to the people194 (for all shifts in
governance privilege some constituencies over others) and to the future of
governmental structure. The Founders were not linguists; they were practical
men creating a political structure, a government, and they reasoned about
constitutional structure in terms of how the government would work in practice,
not based on “parchment barriers.”195 They knew that “parchment barriers” had
failed in securing a separation of powers under state constitutions; that is why
there is no express separation of powers clause in the Constitution, or the Bill of
Rights.196
Textualism, alone, in my opinion, will never answer the hard questions
about executive power. There is simply too little text for all of the complex
situations courts are likely to face. This, of course, leaves us with the question
about where the interpreter goes once text leaves no answers. Originalists will
argue that one should look for the meaning of particular terms in history. If I am
correct about interpretive enrichment, however, if one begins with a
hypothesized textual interpretation that is not in fact true, and one looks for that
interpretation in the historical record, one may simply be confirming a meaning
that the text itself denies. For example, in the Foreign Emoluments Clause case,
there is no doubt that the historical record is likely to refer to cases where
emoluments were attached to offices, since terms like “salary and emoluments”
or “fees and emoluments” were common usage.197 Looking for such usage,
however, may only confirm a meaning—that the Foreign Emoluments Clause
only covers emoluments related to a foreign or domestic office—that is not in
the text of the Constitution.
Traditionally, at least according to Blackstone,198 one applies a plurality of
modalities. Critics of pluralism worry that this grab-bag of considerations is

194. Nourse, supra note 104, at 799–802.
195. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (Jacob Ernest Cooke ed., 1961).
196. Nourse, supra note 140, at 468–70.
197. See Emolument, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Noah Webster ed.,
1828); Fee, id.; Salary, id.; see Mikhail, Definition, supra note 121.
198. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 60 (remarking that the law is to be gathered from “the
words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law”);
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insufficiently rule-like, that it includes no key to the code. If I am right about
pragmatic enrichment, however, there may be a different way of defending
pluralism’s longstanding history—as a constraint on false textual enrichments.
One of the great problems in judicial decision-making is “motivated reasoning,”
which is to say that a judge comes to a decision about who wins, based on her
political views; she then seeks to confirm that view in the existing materials.
Cognitive science calls this a recipe for “confirmation bias.” Judges are using
materials to confirm their political priors, not to falsify their views. If this is right,
critics are correct to wonder whether pluralistic approaches are constraining. Of
course, the same reasoning applies to textualism: judges with political priors find
their preferred meaning in the text, add pragmatic enrichments to the text, and
look to historical materials on meaning to confirm their original bias. As we have
seen, judges who like rule-like terms are fully capable of adding rule-like edges
to a constitution that does not in fact include them.
Why, then, would pluralism ever be more constraining than monistic
attachment to text? Two reasons: first, pluralism opens up the information
economy. As we have seen earlier, one of the reasons that judges interpolate is
that the constitutional text is sparse. If there are competing interpretations,
pluralism allows the interpreter to “falsify” their preferred meaning against the
meanings offered by history, structure, and consequences. So, for example, if
one really wanted to know whether the Framers believed in a textual
interpretation of “all executive power,” one could test this against whether, in
fact, Framers regularly used this phrase (which they did not).199 Recourse to the
history of practical problems200 (like removal) for its potential effects upon
constitutional structure, in turn, offers a check against meanings that will yield
structural harm. Blackstone insisted on this element of the interpretive calculus
in part because it rests upon the perfectly rational assumption that writers
generally do not pen suicide notes. Assuming one believed that “all executive

1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §181, at 135
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (“Mr. Justice Blackstone has remarked, that the intention of a law
is to be gathered from the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the
reason and spirit of the law.”). See generally John P. Figura, Against the Creation Myth of Textualism:
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation in the Nineteenth Century, 80 MISS. L.J. 587 (2010)
(discussing the interpretive rules advanced by nineteenth-century treatise authors).
199. There are occasional references to this enrichment. Madison famously uses it in the removal
debate, but it is not a widely used phrase based on searches of databases on the ratification and the
Constitutional Convention. See John Yoo, George Washington and the Executive Power, 5 U. ST.
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (2010); Search: A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation, LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/hlawquery.html (search title “Farrand’s Records (full
text),” string “all executive power”); Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, AVALON PROJECT
(2008), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp [https://perma.cc/86VH-UFG9].
200. Political writers write in particular political contexts to address particular political problems,
not to define the meaning of words. There is a difference in looking to the past as a dictionary (which
depends upon what words one isolates) and looking to the past to determine how particular political
problems have been resolved over time. See QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN
POLITICAL THOUGHT (1978).
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power” in the domestic sphere was the proper pragmatic reading, one need only
read Steel Seizure,201 or look at recent controversies about the use of torture,202
or even President Barack Obama’s refusal to enforce the immigration law,203 to
see how all Presidents will seek, when they believe it to be necessary, to expand
their powers.
CONCLUSION
In important cases involving issues of executive power, originalists are not
finding meaning in the Constitution, but adding to that meaning. If this is correct,
theorists of originalism must have a more robust theory of the “interpretation
zone,” one that defends the choice of text and pragmatic enrichments that could
well be standing in for the interpreter’s preferences. As for non-originalists, it is
time to insist upon the text of the Constitution, and to refuse to allow textual
arguments that do not in fact reflect the actual Constitutional text.

201. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
202. Janet Cooper Alexander, John Yoo’s War Powers: The Law Review and the World, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 331 (2012).
203. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.

